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Abstract
A constant theme in the endogenous network formation liter-
ature has been the tension between what is privately optimal
for the agents who create a network, and what maximises social
welfare. When the network structure affects, and is affected, by
subsequent agent behaviour, it is also pertinent to ask whether
the overall network and behaviour outcome can agree with soci-
ety’s interests. We explore these questions by critically reviewing
seminal papers in the literature of static and dynamic network
formation, highlighting negative results, and investigating the
sources of inefficiencies. We then present two models featuring
an endogenous partnership formation stage and a subsequent en-
dogenous non-cooperative effort provision stage. In both mod-
els, effort provision actions feature strategic complementarity,
and agents face a negative externality from the links of partners.
Partnerships are non-exclusive and agents face either an indirect
or a direct cost of effort provision. In the first model, agents
are ex ante homogeneous, whereas in the second model agents
have heterogeneous productivity. For various general families of
production functions, we pinpoint the efficient linking and effort
provision strategy profile and compare it with the set of stable
networks. Even though in both models the game is one-shot
and the agents are myopic, we prove that the efficient network
structure and effort provision profile will always be sustained as
an equilibrium of the overall game. For homogeneity, we directly
contrast our positive results with the negative results of the Jack-
son and Wolinsky (1996) [31] Co-author model. We, moreover,
prove that, for some families of production functions, the effi-
cient network is the unique stable network. For heterogeneity,
we additionally perform comparative statics in order to observe
changes in relative specialisation to the high-type partnership, as
the relative productivity ratio and the degree of concavity vary.
Overall, modelling the interplay between link formation decisions
and endogenous effort provision allows us to reach positive re-
sults where stability and efficiency are reconciled.
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Chapter 1
Endogenous network
formation and the tension
between private and social
welfare
1.1 Introduction
Bilateral partnerships are ubiquitous in economic and social life. In such
partnerships, the pair of self-interested agents can represent single individu-
als, firms, countries, or any other autonomous institutions and organisations
of a given form. The overall structure of these partnerships can then be for-
mally modelled as a network of inter-connected agents, where a link exists
between two agents only if they are partners. 1 The study of the endogenous
formation of cooperation structures started with Myerson (1977) [35] and
Aumann and Myerson (1988) [1] but remained at a relatively early stage,
until it was rapidly accelerated in the last twenty years. The development of
tractable theoretical models of network formation has, as noted by Jackson
(2016) [27], recently accelerated once more, driven largely by the need for
rich yet tractable models that can be applied in the empirical analysis of
1In what follows, whenever we refer to a network, unless otherwise specified, we will
mean an undirected network where links need to be formed by mutual consent. On the
contrary, in directed networks links are formed if at least one party wishes to do so.
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real world networks.2
A constant theme, ever since the initial emergence of this literature,
has been the potential tension in the endogenous network formation process
between what is privately optimal for the agents who make the decisions
that create the network, and what would be welfare maximising from a
societal perspective.3 Models of endogenous networks have been examining
whether Adam Smith’s ’invisible hand’ could be extended to the network
formation process: Can the self-interested agents produce network outcomes
that coincide with what is beneficial for society as a whole?
Moreover, in situations where the network structure affects, and is in
turn affected by, subsequent behaviour within the network, we need to ask
whether there can be circumstances under which the overall network and
behaviour outcome agrees with society’s interests. As noted in Jackson
(2016) [27], models of endogenous network formation need to capture the
’co-evolution’ of partnerships and behaviours but this is an area that has
not been studied to a great extent, even though the scope for applications
is immense. A key example is the co-determination of financial investments
and the regime that monitors them. More generally, in social and economic
interactions relationships are formed for a reason, or, in fact, to serve po-
tentially multiple interdependent functions. In such cases, the behaviour
and outcomes in the network affect back the incentives of strategic agents to
maintain or sever their network relationships. Such co-dependencies can be
crucial for understanding networks that function, for instance, as structures
for cooperation, coordination or intermediation, and for analysing policy
interventions in such complex environments. If, on the contrary, as noted
by Vega-Redondo (2016) [38], the co-determination of links and actions is
ignored then models can lead to misleading results and offer a limited or
mistaken understanding of real-world network relationships.
Overall, whether the answers to the previous questions are positive or
negative has obvious consequences for policy making. In the case of nega-
tive results, showing a misalignment between private and social incentives
and optimal outcomes, we would need to measure the extent of the mis-
match and examine the potential for policy interventions. More importantly,
2The initial and more recent contributions on network formation and other areas of
network research are surveyed among others in Jackson (2005a) [22], Jackson (2008) [24],
Jackson (2014) [26], Bloch and Dutta (2011) [3], Goyal (2007) [13], Goyal (2016) [14].
3See for example Jackson (2005a) [22], Jackson (2005b) [23].
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the sources of the observed inefficiencies would need to be determined. As
pointed out in Dutta and Jackson (2003) [9], this is no trivial task. For
individual models the tension can be attributed to externalities of linking
ignored by private players, or to private concerns over bargaining power
when the allocation of value is also endogenously determined. However, a
general characterisation of the determinants of alignment or divergence of
social and private incentives so far does not exist.
Furthermore, in real world networks agents exhibit heterogeneous char-
acteristics that affect their behaviour. The differences in agents’ ex ante
features can lead to differences in their strategic behaviour and, overall, to
different network positions and payoffs. Even more importantly, this het-
erogeneity has the potential to become a further source of tension between
the network outcomes that arise and what society would wish to happen.
Although the danger of lack of tractability is clear, it is of interest to try
and develop models that capture ex ante agent heterogeneity, determine its
effects on network formation and network interaction incentives, and relate
it to ex post agent heterogeneity in the network.
In order to attempt to answer some of these questions set above, the first
task is to define a suitable measure of social efficiency. In the subsection that
follows, we present and compare some of the efficiency concepts that have
been used in the literature on network formation models. Secondly, various
authors have used different processes of network formation and different con-
cepts of stability or equilibrium in order to characterise the result of agents’
self-interested behaviour. We will present most of the stability concepts that
are relevant for network formation models and explain the differences in the
underlying linking processes.
Finally, we will turn to our main area of interest: presenting some char-
acteristic endogenous network formation models and their results regarding
the tension between stability and efficiency. Our motivation will be to try
and uncover the differences in the model setup that can lead to significant
differences in predictions about efficiency. We will also pay particular at-
tention to dynamic models of network formation. For these models, we will
ask whether relaxing the static character of network formation can repair
the mismatch between stable and efficient network outcomes. Lastly, we will
relate the concepts and models presented in this chapter to the models that
of subsequent chapters.
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1.2 Measuring social efficiency
Before proceeding to compare the endogenously derived networks of any
formation process with what would be optimal from the point of view of
society as a whole, we need to carefully define what social efficiency is.
Given the specific assumptions of a model, there are two obvious ways of
defining efficiency in networks. The first is the familiar notion of Pareto
efficiency, applied in a network setup.
Consider a network represented by a graph (N, g), where N = {1, . . . , n}
denotes the set of agents in the network and g the binary matrix of relation-
ships between them. In particular, gij = gji = 1 if agents i, j are linked and
gij = gji = 0 otherwise
4. We denote by G the set of all possible networks
that can be formed by the agents in N . 5 A path in a network g between
nodes i and j will be a sequence of connected nodes i1i2i3 . . . iK−1iK such
that gikik+1 = 1 for each k ∈ [1, . . . ,K − 1] with i1 = i and iK = j and such
that all nodes in the sequence are distinct. The network (N, g) will then be
connected if for each i, j ∈ N there exists a path in (N, g) between i and
j. We next define a component of (N, g) as a distinct maximal connected
subgraph of the network:
Definition 1. A component of a network (N, g) is a nonempty subnetwork
(N ′, g′) such that ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂ N , g′ ⊂ g, (N ′, g′) is connected, and if i ∈ N ′
and gij = 1 then j ∈ N ′ and g′ij = 1.
Assume a value function v that specifies the total value generated by
the network. Assume further that there is a fixed exogenous allocation rule
Y that determines the payoff of each agent corresponding to the value v
created by each network in G. Then a network will be Pareto efficient given
the set of agents, the allocation rule and the value function, if there is no
alternative network that can provide equal or higher payoff for all agents
and strictly higher payoff for at least one of them:
Definition 2. A network g is Pareto efficient in G for (v, Y ) if there exists
no other network g′ ∈ G such that Yi(g′, v) ≥ Yi(g, v) ∀i ∈ N with Yi(g′, v) >
Yi(g, v) for some i ∈ N .
4Using the convention gii = 0.
5When N is considered fixed or given, we will often refer to the network as g.
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Pareto efficiency is a weak concept as it does not demand total welfare
maximisation. In order to see that, we next define the most frequently used
concept of strong efficiency, following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31], and
then proceed to a comparison of the two concepts.
A network will be (strongly) efficient, given some value function if there is
no other network that can give a higher total value. While there always exists
a (strongly) efficient network, it does not need to be unique; it is possible
that the maximum value can be produced by more than one networks.
Definition 3. A network g is (strongly) efficient in G for v if there exists
no other network g′ ∈ G such that v(g′) > v(g).
We notice that the exogenous allocation rule Y does not affect whether
a network is efficient or not from the perspective of society. This provides a
straightforward intuition for the plausibility of a conflict between stability
and efficiency: agents, in the absence of value transfers, benefit only from
the value allocated to them by Y and not from the value v that is generated
by the whole network.
Strong efficiency is, therefore, much more demanding than Pareto ef-
ficiency: a network is (strongly) efficient only if it is Pareto efficient, for
a given value function v, irrespective of the allocation rule Y . We proceed
with a simple example, following in intuition the co-author model of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) [31], through which this difference in the two notions of
efficiency and the fact that Pareto efficiency is weaker will be made manifest.
Example 1. Consider a population of four identical agents defining the set
of feasible networks G. Two agents i, j are neighbours only if a direct link
exist between them by mutual consent i.e. if gij = gji = 1. Let di denote
the number of neighbours of agent i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and Ni the set of
neighbours of agent i. Assume that agents possess an effort endowment of
one unit each, which they allocate equally among all of their partners. If
an agent has no partners then assume that her effort cannot be productively
employed, and hence she makes a payoff of zero. Assume that the value from
a partnership between two agents i, j is given by the sum of the efforts ( 1di ,
1
dj
)
exerted by each of them plus the product of the two efforts. This formulation
allows for some synergy in the production of network value. Therefore,
vij =
1
di
+
1
dj
+
1
di
1
dj
. (1.1)
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Then the total value created by the network will be equal to the sum of the
value of all partnerships:
v(g) =
∑
i∈N,j∈Ni,j>i
[
1
di
+
1
dj
+
1
di
1
dj
]. (1.2)
Assume, finally, that the allocation rule is fixed and specifies that each agent
i receives a half of the value created by each of their partnerships. So,
Yi(g) =
1
2
∑
j∈Ni
[
1
di
+
1
dj
+
1
di
1
dj
]. (1.3)
Consider now the following two networks in G: network gp of two isolated
pairs of agents, and network g′ with a line of three agents and one isolated
agent: take for instance the 132 line with agent 3 in the centre and agent 4
isolated. Then,
v(gp) = 6
v(g′) = 4
Yi(gp) = 1.5, for each i ∈ N
Yi(g
′) = 1, for i = 1, 2
Y3(g
′) = 2 (1.4)
It follows from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that gp is strongly efficient.
On the other hand, g′ is not strongly efficient since v(gp) > v(g′). However,
g′ is Pareto efficient.
These efficiency concepts are suitable for models where no transfers of
value between players are allowed. A transfer between two players is called
direct if the two players are connected and indirect if the two players are not
connected in the network. In the case where any transfer of value is allowed
among players, as in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [5], strong efficiency and
Pareto efficiency become equivalent. This is intuitive as an efficient network
g can become, if suitable indirect transfers are provided, preferable to all
agents and strictly preferable for at least one, than any inefficient network
g′ that is Pareto efficient without transfers.
In order to illustrate this, we can look at network g′ from the above
example; the isolated pairs network creates a higher total value of 6. All
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agents prefer moving to gp from g
′ with agent 4 strictly preferring it, if
indirect transfers are made so that e.g. agents 1, 3, 2 are allocated the same
value as in g′ and agent 4 receives the remaining 6− 4 = 2 instead of zero in
g′. We, therefore, conclude that Pareto efficiency, though weak in general, is
perfectly suitable for models where any reallocation of value is permissible.
Finally, following Jackson (2005a) [22], we present the concept of con-
strained efficiency, which is suitable for models where reallocations of value
among agents are possible but such transfers need to satisfy certain con-
straints. More specifically, instead of allowing for all or no reallocations, as
in strong efficiency and Pareto efficiency respectively, reallocations of value
are allowed as long as they are anonymous and component balanced.6.
An allocation is anonymous if it does not depend on the identity of the
players occupying the various nodes; if players are relabelled, the allocation
must change with the labels:
Definition 4. Consider a permutation pi : N → N and, for any g ∈ G,
let gpi = {{pi(i), pi(j)}|gij = 1}. Define vpi(g) = v(gpi). An allocation rule
Y is anonymous if, for any value function v ∈ V , network g ∈ G, and
permutation of the set of players pi, Ypii(g
pi, vpi) = Yi(g, v).
An allocation is component balanced if the total value allocated in every
component (N ′, g′) of network (N, g) is equal to the total value created by
that component. 7
Definition 5. An allocation rule Y is component balanced if
∑
i∈N ′ Yi(g, v) =
v(g′) for each v, g ∈ G, and component (N ′, g′) of (N, g).
In order to illustrate these restrictions, note, in the context of Example
1.2.1, that the transfer specified is not anonymous: agent 3’s identity matters
as she needs to be allocated a higher share than all the others to agree to
move to gp. But an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule will
give 1.5 to each agent in an isolated pair. Therefore, agent 3, who receives 2
in g′, will be strictly worse-off in gp. We hence see that gp does not dominate
g′ in terms of constrained efficiency.
Definition 6. A network g will be constrained efficient relative to value
function v if and only if it is Pareto efficient relative to v and Y , for ev-
6The following definitions are based on Jackson (2008) [24]
7We restrict attention here to component additive allocations, where the value created
by each component is independent of how other components are organised.
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ery allocation rule Y that is anonymous and component balanced. In other
words, there exists no g′ ∈ G and anonymous and component balanced Y
such that Yi(g
′, v) ≥ Yi(g, v) ∀i ∈ N with Yi(g′, v) > Yi(g, v) for at least one
i ∈ N .
This is, therefore, an intermediate concept of efficiency that falls between
Pareto efficiency and strong efficiency. In particular, Jackson (2005a) [22]
points out that for a component balanced and anonymous allocation rule Y ,
efficient networks are a subset of constrained efficient networks, which are,
in turn, a subset of Pareto efficient networks with no transfers permitted.
Existence of an efficient network thus guarantees the existence of a con-
strained efficient and a Pareto efficient network in G, for any value function
and allocation rule. Note, finally, that models have made use of different
concepts of constrained efficiency by demanding a set of constraints other
than anonymity and component balance.
1.3 Stability in static models of endogenous net-
work formation
The natural next step in our analysis is to consider the various stability and
equilibrium definitions that have been used in the literature of endogenous
network formation in order to describe the outcome of the network formation
process.8 This section will present the concepts of Nash stability, as in
Myerson (1977) [35], Pairwise Nash stability and Pairwise stability, following
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31], Bilateral Equilibrium as in Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2007) [19], and Strong equilibrium, as discussed in Dutta
and Mutuswami (1997) [10] and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)
[28]. We will restrict attention to stability and equilibrium concepts without
value transfers between agents.
Starting with Nash stability, Myerson (1991) [35] models the bilateral
link formation process as a non-cooperative simultaneous-move game. A
strategy for a player i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} is an announcement of intended
links si ∈ Si = {0, 1}n−1, where sij = 1 or sij = 0 if agent i wants to form
a link with j or not, respectively. Links need mutual consent in order to be
8For a comprehensive analysis and comparison of some of the numerous concepts see
Bloch and Jackson (2006) [4].
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formed i.e. ij will be formed only if sij = sji = 1. Therefore, a strategy
profile s for all players induces a network g(s) and individual payoffs Πi(g(s))
for the players. 9 Then a network g(s) is Nash stable if and only if there is
no unilateral deviation in the linking strategy of any player that would lead
them to a strictly higher payoff:
Definition 7. A strategy profile s of linking announcements is a Nash Equi-
librium of the linking game iff Πi(g(s)) ≥ Πi(g(s′i, s−i)) for all i ∈ N , s′i ∈ Si.
The network g(s) is then Nash stable.
There is broad consensus in the network formation literature that this is
too weak an equilibrium concept and unsuitable for the study of undirected
link formation. It allows for too many equilibria networks with undesirable
properties. The key example is the empty network which is always Nash
stable as the agents cannot coordinate their linking announcements in order
to form a new link and are merely allowed to unilaterally deviate in the form
of link cutting.
Some of these problems are remedied by the refinement of Pairwise Nash
Equilibrium. Agents are now allowed to deviate in pairs in order to form a
new link, or to unilaterally deviate by cutting as many of their existing links
as they wish.10
Definition 8. A strategy profile s is a Pairwise Nash Equilibrium of the
simultaneous-move linking game iff (a) Πi(g(s)) ≥ Πi(g(s′i, s−i)) for all i ∈
N , s′i ∈ Si, and (b) for any i such that Πi(g(s)+ ij) > Πi(g(s))⇒ Πj(g(s)+
ij) < Πj(g(s)). Network g(s) is then called Pairwise Nash stable.
A related concept is that of Pairwise stability, employed by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) [31]. Agents are allowed to deviate in pairs to form a new
link, or to unilaterally deviate by cutting any one link. A network will now be
Pairwise stable if neither of these types of deviations can be strictly profitable
for both link-forming agents or for the link-cutting agents, respectively. We,
therefore, directly observe that the set of Pairwise Nash stable networks is
a refinement on the set of Pairwise stable networks as, in the former case,
agents are permitted more types of deviations.
9We will denote by g+ ij the new network formed by g with the addition of a new link
ij, and by g − ij the network formed by g with the omission of existing link ij.
10For a formal study of this equilibrium concept see for example Calvo´-Armengol and
Ilkilic (2009) [7].
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Definition 9. A network g is Pairwise stable with respect to a payoff func-
tion Π if: (a) for all i ∈ N and links ij ∈ g, Πi(g) ≥ Πi(g− ij), and (b) for
all ij 6∈ g, if Πi(g + ij) > Πi(g) then Πj(g + ij) < Πj(g).
We note that, contrary to Myerson’s Nash stability, Pairwise stability
and Pairwise Nash stability do not correspond to a purely non-cooperative
game. They are instead allowing for ’intuitive’ deviations by a pair of agents,
since link formation requires, by definition, mutual consent and hence some
form of bilateral cooperation. Pairwise stability is an attractive concept for
use in many applications due to its tractability and good predictive power.
However, it can also be considered too weak as it allows for a very limited
set of deviations. Therefore, networks that are Pairwise stable may not be
stable against richer deviations, one example already discussed being the
simultaneous deletion of multiple links by an agent.11
The next equilibrium concept we will discuss is the Bilateral Equilibrium
of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) [19]. This can be described as a further
refinement on the Pairwise Nash Equilibrium concept. Agents are now al-
lowed to unilaterally deviate by cutting as many links as they wish, and to
bilaterally deviate by forming a link between them and/or deleting any com-
bination of their links that they wish. Intuitively, on top of any unilateral
deviations involving link cutting, agents are additionally allowed all possible
deviations in a coalition of size two, in full recognition of the cooperative
nature of undirected linking. In a Bilateral Equilibrium network, none of
these deviations can be profitable for all agents involved.
Definition 10. A strategy profile s is a Bilateral Equilibrium if the following
conditions hold: (a) For any i ∈ N and every si, s′i ∈ Si, Πi(s) ≥ Πi(s′i, s−i),
and (b) for any pair of players i, j ∈ N and every strategy pair (si, sj),
Πi(s
′
i, s
′
j , s−i−j) > Πi(s)⇒ Πj(s′i, s′j , s−i−j) < Πi(s).
This equilibrium concept is appealing in situations where links are costly
and hence agents have limitations, via a fixed endowment or a convex cost
of linking, as to how many links they will create. In such setups, Pairwise
stability notions can characterise as stable, networks that would not survive
a bilateral deviation where agents, at the same time as forming the link
11In Bloch and Jackson (2007) [5], it is in fact pointed out that the set of Pairwise Nash
equilibria is the intersection of Nash equilibria of Myerson’s game and Pairwise stable
networks.
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between them, can cut a number of other links in order to free up endowment
or balance out the cost of the additional link formed.
Finally, following Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) [28], we look at
an even stronger stability concept, Strong stability, where coalitions of any
size are allowed to deviate by forming links between them and/or severing
any of their links. A network will then be Strongly stable if, for any possible
coalitional deviation, there is always at least one member of the coalition
who would block it because they end up with a strictly smaller share than
before.
Definition 11. A network g is Strongly stable with respect to an allocation
rule Y and a value function v if for any subset of agents C ⊆ N , g′ that
is obtainable from g via deviations by C, and i ∈ C such that Yi(g′, v) >
Yi(g, v), there exists j ∈ C such that Yj(g′, v) < Yj(g, v).
This definition of Strong stability is slightly stronger than that originally
introduced by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) [10]: here a coalition of agents
is allowed to deviate if some among them are strictly better off and all others
are weakly better off. On the contrary, in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) [10],
all members of a coalition need to be strictly better off for a deviation to
proceed. The above definition, therefore, implies Bilateral stability (and
Pairwise stability) if we look at coalitions of size two; the set of Strongly
stable networks will be a subset of the set of Bilateral equilibrium networks.
However, demanding that a network survives from any possible deviation
of any coalition of agents in C ⊆ N can prove to be so restrictive that
no Strongly stable network exists. Moreover, stability concepts allowing for
coalitions of a greater size than two to deviate, move even further away from
the setup of a non-cooperative game without any corresponding justification
in the linking process.
Finally, as pointed out in Jackson (2005) [22], all of the above stabil-
ity and equilibrium concepts are not only static but also fully myopic. In
particular, myopic individuals do not predict or take into account how the
others may react to their (unilateral or bilateral) deviations. For example,
a bilateral deviation of a pair of agents where they form the link between
them and cut several links with others, may result in further deviations by
other agents, until a stable network is reached and no further deviations are
profitable. While the bilateral deviation might have been deemed strictly
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profitable, it can well be that in the final network, after all reactions of other
players to it have taken place, the pair becomes strictly worse off than in
the original network.
1.4 The tension between stability and efficiency
In this section, we turn to the analysis of some endogenous network forma-
tion models, selected to reflect the motivation and interest of this and the
remaining two chapters. 12 Our focus in what follows will be on inefficiencies
in the endogenously determined networks.
The first models in this literature were explicitly preoccupied with the
tension between stability and efficiency and with potential mechanisms to
restore efficiency by aligning social with private incentives. The recent litera-
ture, on the other hand, has been focusing on the interplay and co-evolution
of links and actions. Overall efficiency can then be examined in a richer
setup where the network is built for an explicit function, and any inefficien-
cies can be attributed to a variety of sources. It will be of particular interest
to see to what extent observed inefficiencies can be attributed to agent my-
opia, and whether, and to what extent, dynamic evolution of the network
can restore efficiency.
1.4.1 A seminal model on the tension between stability and
efficiency
We start with the seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
[31] which was among the first to illustrate the mismatch between stability
and efficiency when agents are free to shape the network based on their
private incentives. The authors employ the concepts of strong efficiency
and pairwise stability. They present two stylized models for which they
characterise the stable and efficient networks, and show that the set of stable
networks and the set of efficient networks do not always intersect. Then,
returning to a more general model setup, they show that there are network
value functions for which no anonymous and component balanced allocation
12For more exhaustive reviews of the older and more recent literature in endogenous
network formation, look for example at Bloch and Dutta (2011) [3], Dutta and Jackson
(2003) [9], Goyal (2016) [14], Jackson (2005) [22], Jackson (2008) [24], Jackson (2014)
[26], Jackson (2005) [23], Jackson (2011) [25], Vannetelbosch and Mauleon (2016) [36] and
Vega-Redondo (2016) [38].
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rule can support the strongly efficient network as a pairwise stable network
of the game. Therefore, there is tension between stability and efficiency that
is, moreover, not easily resolved for general classes of value functions and
allocation rules.
The first stylised model that the authors present is the Connections
model: agents link with others for the purpose of social communication. So-
cial communication can be direct, between neighbours, or indirect, between
neighbours of neighbours etc., however, the value of communication decays
as the distance between the agents in the network increases. Communication
linking also entails a cost that the agent takes into account when determin-
ing her linking strategy. An agent pays only for forming direct links but
can then enjoy the benefit of indirect links with no additional cost. So, a
link between i and j also brings benefits to any neighbour of i who is not
directly connected to j. So,this is a model of positive externalities. The au-
thors show that, for a symmetric version of the model, the unique strongly
efficient network in the connections model is either the complete graph, or
a star encompassing everyone, or the empty network.13 Intuitively, which
network is the efficient one will depend on how high the cost of direct linking
is compared to the decay in the value of communication from indirect links.
Next, the authors show that in the symmetric connections model, where
each agent’s allocated value is the utility that she receives from the commu-
nication network, a pairwise stable network has at most one (non-empty)
component. In particular, for a small linking cost, the unique pairwise sta-
ble network is the complete network. For intermediate cost values, a star
encompassing all players is pairwise stable but not necessarily the unique
pairwise stable network. Finally, for high cost values, any pairwise stable
network which is non-empty is such that each player has at least two links.
Therefore, while it is possible to achieve efficiency for sufficiently low cost
values, inefficient stable networks may well arise for intermediate and high
linking cost values.
The second stylised model that is presented is the Co-author model:
agents can be thought of as researchers whose productivity is a function
of the number of their co-authors. Then each link can be interpreted as a
13A network is complete if all possible links are formed. It is empty if no links are
formed between agents. It has a star structure if a set of agents, the core or centre, is
connected with everyone else and the remaining agents, the periphery, is only connected
with the agents in the centre.
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(mutually agreed) research collaboration. There is no direct cost of link for-
mation but each agent has a fixed endowment to distribute, assume equally,
among their collaborators. Therefore, the more links the agent has, the less
she is going to offer to each of her co-authors. Moreover, the more fellow
collaborators each of an agent’s own collaborators has, the less she is go-
ing to benefit from that link. Each new link formed, therefore, reduces the
value of all existing links. So, this is a model of negative externalities. Each
collaboration product is defined as the mathematical sum plus the math-
ematical product of the two collaborators’ efforts. The productivity of a
player is then determined by the sum of research products from all their
collaborations.
The authors show that, under these assumptions, if the number of agents
N is even, then the strongly efficient network consists of N/2 separate pairs.
However, a pairwise stable network can be partitioned into fully connected
components, each of which has a different number of members. Therefore,
the stable and efficient networks do not coincide; the stable network will be
over-connected from a social perspective. This inefficiency is attributed to
the fact that the self-interested agents do not fully internalise the negative
externality of additional links to the value created by existing links.
Finally, the authors turn to a more general version of their model, which
encompasses both stylised models presented above. They prove that, for
three or more agents, there is no allocation rule Y that is anonymous and
component balanced and which can support, for each network value function
v, at least one strongly efficient graph as pairwise stable. The authors explain
that this negative result is not due to non-existence; there can always be
found an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule for which a
pairwise stable network does exist. However, such a rule will always have
the property that, for some value functions, the pairwise stable networks
that it supports are all inefficient.
In Jackson (2005) [22], it is, furthermore, shown that there does not exist
any component balanced and anonymous allocation rule such that, for every
value function, there exists a constrained efficient network that is pairwise
stable. This result further strengthens the above incompatibility result of
Jackson and Wolinksy (1996) [31] by extending it to the less strict case of
constrained efficiency.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31] prove that stability and efficiency can
14
be reconciled if the requirement for component balance is dropped. If, on
the other hand, anonymity is dropped instead, Dutta and Mutuswami (1997)
[10] show that there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that
the intersection of efficient and pairwise stable networks is non-empty. More-
over, it is shown that Y is anonymous, in addition to component balanced,
for some networks in this set. These results are making use of the concept of
strong stability, however, they can be shown to extend to the case of pairwise
stability as well. Therefore, we conclude that if one is willing to drop compo-
nent balance, efficiency and stability are no longer incompatible. Moreover,
if one is willing to drop anonymity, then again stability and efficiency can
be reconciled. Finally, for some value functions, neither component balance
nor anonymity needs to be sacrificed.
Nevertheless, as Jackson (2011) [25] points out, it is striking that, even
when agents have full information and the ability to reallocate value up to
some, not too strict, constraints of component balance and anonymity, the
conflict between stability and efficiency still persists. In particular, this fact
contradicts the spirit of the ’Coase theorem’: One would expect that with
full information and the opportunity to make value transfers, fully efficient
outcomes would be always obtained. This has not always been true, however,
for the multi-agent endogenous network formation literature.
Bloch and Jackson (2007) [5] return to the problem of reconciling effi-
ciency with stability by examining the use of transfers. They investigate
different setups based on the types of transfers that are permissible. More
specifically, they contrast the implications of the following transfer regimes:
(i) transfers can be made only between directly connected agents or between
indirectly connected agents as well; (ii) transfers to a link can be agreed con-
tingent on only that link being formed or on the entire formed network; (iii)
players can pay other players to induce them to refrain from forming links
or no such payments are allowed.
The authors find that, in the case where only directly linked agents
are allowed to make transfers to each other, efficient networks can be, but
will not always be, supported in equilibrium. Even if indirect transfers are
allowed, in order to guarantee that efficient networks form, players need to
moreover be able to make those transfers contingent on the entire network.
The intuition is that there are multiple potential sources of inefficiencies
that need to be dealt with: indirect payments are used to deal with positive
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externalities of linking but network contingent transfers can also be needed
to deal with the combinatorial nature of network formation. Finally, in order
to deal with the inefficiency stemming from negative externalities in network
formation, like in the case of the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) [31], players need to be able to pay other players to induce them not
to form additional links.
Finally, other authors have examined whether (at least part of) the con-
flict between stability and efficiency can be attributed to the fact that agents
are myopic. Grandjean, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2011) [20] look at the
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31] model when agents are instead assumed
to be farsighted: when contemplating a deviation they take into account the
full series of subsequent deviations that can result out of it. In this context,
a set of networks G′ is defined as Pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possi-
ble farsighted pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G′ to a network not
in G′ are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off; (ii)
if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set
G′ leading to some network within G′;14 and (iii) if there is no proper subset
of G′ satisfying the first two conditions. The authors show that even far-
sightedness is not able to eliminate the conflict between stability and strong
efficiency for intermediate levels of link formation cost. However, it is shown
that farsightedness does reduce the discrepancy between pairwise stable and
efficient networks when the cost of linking takes high enough values.
1.4.2 Dynamic network formation models
Faced with the incompatibility of efficiency and stability exposed by the
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31] model, a stream of literature has natu-
rally examined whether this negative result could be attributed to the static
nature of the network formation game. The first model to study this was by
Watts (2001) [39], who explicitly presents a dynamic version of the Jackson
and Wolinksy (1996) [31] Connections model.
More specifically, Watts(2001) [39] proposes a dynamic model where
agents are allowed to cut or form links. The process starts with the empty
network and then, as time goes by, random pairs of agents meet and decide
whether to form a link between them or to unilaterally sever links, in or-
14Assume we start at a network outside G′. A farsighted improving path is a series of
profitable deviations by farsighted agents that ultimately leads us to a network in G′.
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der to (myopically) maximise current period payoffs. In each period, a link
is randomly chosen to be updated with uniform probability. In particular,
in an extension of pairwise-stability, when forming a link agents are at the
same time allowed to simultaneously cut any number of their existing links
with mutual agreement. In this setup, a network will be stable if no single
player wants to sever any one direct link, and no pair of players wants to
form the link between them, with the possibility of simultaneously cutting
any number of their existing links.
Note that this stability concept is still weaker than Bilateral Equilibrium.
It cannot, however, be compared in a straightforward way with pairwise
Nash stability because, in the latter, players are not allowed to form a link
and cut links simultaneously but they are allowed to unilaterally sever any
number of links instead of just one.
Payoffs are specified as in the Connections model of Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996) [31], which we reviewed earlier. Results are, therefore, similarly
driven by the relationship between the size of benefits from indirect links
and the size of the cost of direct link formation. In particular, the author
verifies that the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31] stability and efficiency
results carry through for the static version of her model.
The author then moves on to determine to which network structures
the dynamic network formation process will converge, asking whether the
process can converge to the efficient network. She proves that the dynamic
process does not always converge to the efficient star network structure. In
such cases, it will either converge to another inefficient stable network or
move in cycles, visiting the same series of networks in a specific order. For
certain parameter values such cycles can be ruled out but the possibility of
convergence to an inefficient network still remains.
In particular, the dynamic formation process with myopic agents will be
path-dependent: if the benefit from maintaining an indirect link of length
two is greater than the net benefit from maintaining a direct link, then
the efficient network will only form if the order in which agents meet takes a
particular pattern. Finally, as the number of agents in the network increases,
meeting in the specific pattern or path necessary for convergence to the
efficient star network will be less likely. The possibility of convergence to an
inefficient network will then be even higher.
A natural extension of the above model would be to the case where agents
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are not fully myopic in their strategic decision making. Dutta et al. (2005)
[8] present a dynamic model of network formation where agents have some
degree of foresight i.e. when deciding on a current action, they evaluate its
effect on their entire discounted stream of payoffs.
Their dynamic link updating process is as follows: at any date a pair of
agents is randomly chosen and allowed to unilaterally break any link they
already have, and bilaterally form the link between them. This corresponds
to a limited form of cooperation, where a coalition of size two is allowed
to jointly deviate by forming the link among its members and/or deleting
existing links with non-coalition members. Payoffs for that date are instantly
realised and the whole process is then repeated. An equilibrium network
formation process will be, in this context, a strategy profile for the dynamic
game such that no active pair at any state can benefit either from unilateral
link cutting or from bilateral link formation. When contemplating such
deviations, active agents will be farsighted i.e. for a given value function
they will evaluate the entire stream of profits that will accrue based on their
actions and the consequences of their actions for all dates in the future.
Note that the myopic case, examined by Watts (2001) [39] above, can be
obtained as the special case when agents are perfectly impatient, with a
discount factor equal to zero.
The authors define efficient networks using the definition of strong effi-
ciency and then specify different ways in which a dynamic network formation
process can yield these efficient outcomes; what they call different concepts
of ’absorption’. Namely, the efficient network will be strongly absorbing
when the network formation process reaches it, regardless of the network
we begin with. It will instead simply be a stationary network if there is no
guarantee that it will be reached but, if reached, there will be no further
deviations.
Given the above model setup, the authors show that there are valuation
structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain an efficient
network. They then proceed to determine conditions on the valuation struc-
ture such that an efficient network will be strongly absorbing. They find
that, for valuation functions that satisfy link monotonicity15, the strongly
15A valuation function satisfies link monotonicity, if an individual’s payoff is increasing
in her number of links. A valuation function satisfies increasing returns to link creation, if
it satisfies link monotonicity in a subcollection of components, with the additional require-
ment that aggregate value also increases over this subcollection. Formal definitions can
18
efficient complete network will be strongly absorbing at some strategy profile
for all discount rates larger than zero, i.e. whenever agents are not fully my-
opic. In addition, in cases where the valuation function satisfies increasing
returns to linking and the allocation rule is the component-wise egalitarian
rule, the complete network will be strongly absorbing at some pure strategy
equilibrium profile, provided that the common discount rate is sufficiently
large.
However, a direct consequence of the above results is that the efficient
network will not be strongly absorbing at all equilibria even if all the condi-
tions we pose on the valuation function, the allocation rule and the discount
factor are met. This leads to the conclusion that the tension between stabil-
ity and efficiency cannot be fully resolved by a dynamic network formation
setup, even if agents are allowed to be farsighted.
1.4.3 Endogenous network formation and the static and dy-
namic interplay between links and actions
In a recent review of the literature in network formation, Vega-Redondo
(2016) [38] stresses the importance of creating models that incorporate both
strategic linking and strategic behaviour in the formed network. In many
real life situations, agents have control of both their structure of interactions
and the behaviour that they exhibit in them. Therefore, there is a great
interest in models that can account for both of these dimensions and shed
light in the ’co-evolution’ of links and actions.
Even though endogenising both the network and agents’ behaviour in
it increases the analytical challenges of a model, Vega-Redondo argues that
such models are indispensable for the study of situations as broad as those
of coordination, cooperation, intermediation, bargaining, local public good
provision, learning, and conflict in networks.
In the remaining section, we will review a selection of such models. We
will focus on the different methods for the co-determination of equilibrium
networks and embedded behaviour, and on the assessment of the efficiency
of such outcomes. We will also investigate the sources of inefficiencies when
they are predicted by the models. More specifically, we will look at some
characteristic models, both of a static and a dynamic setup, which fall into
be found in Dutta et al.(2005) [8]. The component-wise egalitarian rule allocates equal
shares to all agents in any given component.
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the broad category of endogenous networks with endogenous actions featur-
ing by strategic complementarity.
We begin with a model of a coordination game played in an endogenous
directed network proposed by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) [18]. In the
basic model, links are costly and one-sided so that a player can unilaterally
choose their partners and then play a coordination game with all of them.
There is a constraint on the action space demanding that the same action be
played in all coordination games by the same agent. The authors look at the
stable networks that can result out of the strategic cost-benefit behaviour
of agents, and at whether the efficient coordination outcome can arise, both
in a static and a dynamic setup.
Agents unilaterally choose their location in the network, which then de-
termines the set of direct partners with whom they will play a 2 × 2 sym-
metric coordination game with common action sets A = {α, β}. There are
two, Pareto ranked, Nash equilibria of the one-shot simultaneous move game
with coordination, {(α, α), (β, β)}, which result in coordination payoffs (d, d)
and (b, b), respectively. Payoffs for the outcome (α, β), where agents fail to
coordinate, are (e, f). The coordination game is described by the following
overall relationship between payoff values: d > f , b > e, d > b, d+e < b+f .
The state (α, α) is the Pareto optimal one since d > b, but choosing β is the
risk dominant action for players, since b+ f > d+ e i.e. the average payoff
from β is higher than that from playing α. Therefore, there is a conflict
between risk dominance and efficiency. Links are costly, with cost c > 0,
and, in the basic model, one-sided, so that the linking game is a fully non-
cooperative game. Since each player is obliged to choose the same action in
the games played with all of their neighbours, strategic behaviour will also
be influenced by the structure of the network.
Starting with a static analysis of the model, the authors show that net-
work structure and coordination results are driven by the cost of link for-
mation c. In particular, if the cost is low, with c < e, then players have
incentives to link with everyone, irrespective of the actions played by others,
hence the complete network is obtained. The complete network is also ob-
tained if costs are high enough, with d > c > b, because in that case everyone
linked must be choosing the efficient action α so linking has a guaranteed
high payoff. However, for intermediate cost values, a wider range of out-
comes can arise in equilibrium; the complete network or a network of two
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distinct complete components are both possible equilibria. This stems from
the fact that, intuitively, for intermediate cost values, linking is profitable
only when all others choose the same action and coordination is achieved.
In similar spirit, the equilibrium results in the coordination game are also
driven by the size of linking costs, and for intermediate cost values a wide
range of outcomes can arise in equilibrium. These include social conformity
to the efficient or to the inefficient action, as well as action heterogeneity.
As a result of the above, for intermediate cost values, it is possible for
the equilibrium to feature neither the complete network nor the efficient
coordination outcome. Therefore, in such cases, equilibrium selection is
crucial. In order to try and achieve this, the authors look at a dynamic
version of the model where agents are allowed to adjust their links. Once
more, the level of the link formation cost remains a key factor that drives
results, however, much sharper equilibrium predictions can now be obtained.
In particular, for intermediate costs, the authors show that the com-
plete network will be stable in the long run, and that, in that case, social
conformism will also arise. However, if the cost of link formation is high
enough, agents will all conform to the socially inefficient risk-dominant ac-
tion. It is only for low enough cost values that the efficient coordination
outcome can be obtained. Therefore, allowing for dynamic adjustment in
linking, although helpful for equilibrium selection and sharper predictions on
the overall network structure and behaviour, is not always enough to elim-
inate inefficiencies. It is still possible that agents coordinate in the Pareto
dominated outcome.
These results carry through when the model is extended to a setup where
linking takes place by mutual consent and the linking cost is equally divided.
For the static model, it is shown that the complete network is the unique
non-empty strict Nash network, and that social conformism always takes
place. However, both the Pareto optimal and the Pareto dominated coor-
dination outcome can still arise in equilibrium. For the dynamic version of
this model, it is again the case that a threshold level of linking cost exists:
For all cost levels above this threshold the efficient outcome is the unique
equilibrium outcome. On the contrary, for all cost levels below the threshold,
the inefficient outcome becomes the unique equilibrium.
This negative result echoes those of Jackson and Watts (2002) [30]. They
present a dynamic model where agents play a coordination game with their
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neighbours but are also able to choose who these neighbours are by being
periodically allowed to add or cut links. The authors come up with a mul-
tiplicity of stable outcomes. These crucially include networks where the
equilibria of the coordination game are neither efficient nor risk-dominant.
We, finally, briefly turn to two models of peer effects. In these models,
links and effort decisions are made in a context of local complementarities
in effort levels and positive local externalities.16 Hiller (2012) [21] in his
working paper presents a simple model of undirected link formation. An
agent’s optimal effort provision decision depends on the structure of the
network but also on the effort provision decisions of the other agents, giving
rise to strategic complementarity. A broad family of payoff functions is used
which feature individual payoffs that are convex in the effort levels of direct
neighbours. It is shown that pairwise Nash stable networks display either
a complete, an empty or a core-periphery structure. Although no direct
comparison of equilibrium results with social efficiency is made, it is clear
that depending on which of the three equilibria is selected, stability and
efficiency may not agree.
KG’Anig, Tessone, and Zenou (2012) [33], on the other hand, present a
dynamic model of peer effects with a linear-quadratic payoff specification.
They look at a dynamic process of link formation where, in each period,
agents play the following two-stage game: in stage one, each agent chooses
an effort level considering the network as fixed; in the second stage the
network structure can be updated by a randomly selected agent who is
allowed to create a costless new link. Looking at the stable networks of
this dynamic link formation process with endogenous actions, they show
that these networks will feature ’nestedness’ i.e. that the network structure
will be such that the set of neighbours of each agent is a subset of the set
of neighbours of each agent with a higher degree. This family of networks
obviously contains the core-periphery family of networks. Therefore, we
see that dynamic models are once more able to give a sharper prediction
regarding the shape of stable networks that are possible to arise.
16Local complementarities in effort levels correspond to the case where a higher effort by
a partner induces an agent to further increase their own effort. Positive local externalities
of linking refer to the case where an agent is better off the more connected their partners
are.
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1.5 Outline and contribution
In the two chapters that follow, our fundamental contribution will be suc-
ceeding in reconciling efficiency with stability in the context of two models
of endogenous link formation and endogenous actions. Both models will be
dynamic to the extent that the one-shot game played will be a game with
two sequential stages: an endogenous link formation stage where links are
two-sided and hence partial cooperation for pairs of agents is permitted; and
an endogenous non-cooperative decision-making stage where agents choose
their effort provision after observing the entire network that has formed in
stage one.
In both models, the effort provision actions of agents will feature strategic
complementarity. Each bilateral partnership will result in some production
that uses the two efforts as inputs. This production will then be fully enjoyed
by the two partners according to an egalitarian rule but will be perfectly ex-
cludable from anyone else. There is, moreover, a negative externality to an
agent from the other links of their partners. Partnerships are non-exclusive
and the agents either have a fixed effort endowment to allocate, hence in-
troducing an indirect cost of effort provision, or face a direct convex cost
of effort. In the first model of Chapter 2, agents will be ex ante homoge-
neous in all features, whereas in the second model of Chapter 3 agents have
heterogeneous productivity.
We are going to use the definition of strong efficiency presented earlier
and pinpoint, for general families of production functions, the efficient link-
ing and effort provision strategy profile, in order to compare it with the
stable networks obtained. Stability will be defined using a variant of the
Bilateral Equilibrium concept previously presented in this Chapter, in or-
der to incorporate a Nash Equilibrium effort provision profile for the second
stage of the game. Agents will use backwards induction when deciding on
their linking profiles, anticipating that linking deviations will lead to a new
network where effort provision in the second stage will be determined by
a new Nash Equilibrium. However, when agents consider unilateral or bi-
lateral deviations in the linking stage, they will take as given the linking
decisions of all non-deviating agents.
Even though in both models the two-stage game that agents play is one-
shot and agents are myopic, we are able to prove that the efficient network
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structure and effort provision profile will, in all cases, be sustained as an
equilibrium of the overall two-stage game. This will be shown both for a
model with an arbitrary number of homogeneous agents and various families
of production functions, and for a model with four heterogeneous agents and
concave net production. For the homogeneous model, we will be able to
directly contrast our positive results with the negative results of the seminal
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31] Co-author model. In particular, for the
production function of their model as well as for some more general families
of productions functions, we are able to prove that the efficient network
is the unique stable network and, therefore, social efficiency and stability
always agree.
We believe that these results stem from the fact that, firstly, our equilib-
rium concept allows for all intuitive deviations in a bilateral link formation
model. Since agents form links with mutual consent, it is intuitive to allow
them to deviate in pairs in the link formation stage of the game. Secondly
and most importantly, both of our models include a distinct endogenous
effort provision stage. It is this explicit modelling of the interplay between
link formation decisions and endogenous effort provision actions that allows
us to reach these important positive results and contribute to a long stream
of literature in endogenous network formation by showing that stability and
efficiency can be reconciled.
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Chapter 2
Endogenous Formation of
Bilateral Partnerships with
Homogeneous Types
2.1 Introduction
In this section we study a game with a distinct link formation stage and
a subsequent link-specific effort provision stage, where investment incen-
tives depend on the network structure that has arisen from the first stage.
We extend the Bilateral Equilibrium stability concept used in Goyal Vega-
Redondo (2007) [19] to a two-stage game in order to incorporate a Nash
Equilibrium in effort allocations in the second stage of the game. We prove
that, even though inefficient equilibria may exist, the efficient network is
always an equilibrium, under both strict concavity and strict convexity of
synergistic production. We are hence able to revisit the seminal Co-author
model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)[31]. In that paper, as well as in an
important string of subsequent literature, an important tension was shown
between the endogenously determined and the socially optimal network.
More specifically, it was shown that the pairwise stable networks would be
more connected than efficiency demands, and this was attributed by the
authors to the negative externalities arising from link formation. On the
contrary, in what follows, we are able to reconcile efficiency with stability,
both for a production function corresponding to that model and for more
general families of production functions. As we will see, this will be achieved
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by endogenising the agents’ link-specific effort provision decisions, and be-
ing able to compare the set of efficient outcomes with the set of equilibrium
outcomes of the resulting two-stage game.
2.2 The Model
We consider a finite population of homogeneous agents N = {1, 2, ..., n}.
The agents’ interaction is modelled as the following two-stage game:
The first stage is the Myerson linking game described in Chapter 1. So,
all agents simultaneously announce the set of agents with whom they want
to form bilateral partnerships. Let si ∈ {0, 1}n−1 denote the set of agents
with whom i wants to form a link, the interpretation being that sij = 1
denotes that i wants to form a link with j. A partnership between i and
j forms iff both the agents want to form the link or partnership; that is, if
sij = sji = 1. We assume that there is a “small” cost µ¯ > 0 which has to be
borne by both agents if a link is formed. In particular, for this chapter, we
assume µ¯ < 1. We use µ(g) to denote the total cost of forming the links in
any network g. So, using gij = 1 if ij ∈ g and gij = 0 otherwise, for i, j ∈ N
and i 6= j:
µ(g) = 2µ¯
∑
ij
gij (2.1)
Each action profile s = (s1, ..., sn) will, therefore, induce a network g(s).
We denote by G the set of all possible networks that can be formed by the
n players. Let di(g) denote the degree of i in the network g, while Ni(g) is
the set of her neighbours in g. A component of any graph g is a subgraph
such that all nodes in the subgraph are connected by a path, while no nodes
outside the subgraph are connected to nodes in the subgraph. Components
will be denoted by q and the set of nodes (or players) in q will be denoted
by N(q).
At the end of the first stage, players observe the network which has
formed.
In the second stage, agents simultaneously announce their effort alloca-
tion decisions after observing network g(s). Each agent i has an endowment
of one unit of effort, and has to decide how to allocate this effort endowment
across partnerships. For any player i, let Ei = {ei ∈ Rn−1+ |
∑
j∈N−{i} eij ≤
1}, with eij = 0 whenever gij = 0. This introduces an indirect cost of effort,
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as the more effort is exerted in one partnership the less remaining effort
the agent has to exert elsewhere. It also implies a negative externality to
each agent from the other partnerships that their own partners have. Let
E = E1×E2× . . .×En. A feasible strategy for player i in the second stage
of the game is, therefore, a mapping mi : G → Ei. Whenever there is no
confusion about the network which has formed in the first stage, we will sim-
ply represent effort allocation decisions by ei, e
′
i, etc. instead of mi(g),m
′
i(g)
and so on.
Suppose the network g has formed in the first stage, andm(g) = (e1, . . . en)
∈ E. Each partnership ij ∈ g results in the production of some output ac-
cording to the following production function:
F (eij , eji) = eij + eji + f(eij , eji) (2.2)
where f(eij , eji) = 0 if either eij = 0 or eji = 0. f(eij , eji) is a strictly in-
creasing function whenever eij > 0, eji > 0. The term f(eij , eji) represents
the synergy between the two members of the partnership ij. The assump-
tions on f imply that the synergy is generated only when both partners put
in positive effort into the partnership. We will call a partnership ’active’
whenever eij > 0, eji > 0, i.e. whenever the synergy is positive.
This is a generalisation of the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31] model
of co-authorship in two respects. First, in the Jackson and Wolinsky model,
effort choice is not endogenous. Each individual chooses an equal amount
of effort on each of her links, so that eij =
1
di(g)
for all j ∈ Ni(g). Given
this specification, their model’s linear term in the production function is the
same as ours. Second, their synergy term between i and j is simply the
product eijeji, whereas we allow for a more general specification. Our main
contribution is to show that for some general specifications of the synergy
term (which include the case presented by Jackson and Wolinsky), there will
always be an equilibrium of the overall game which supports the efficient out-
come. This comes into direct contrast with their seminal inefficiency result
and we believe that this difference is due to the endogenous specification of
effort choice.1
After the two-stage game is played, payoffs are realised for all agents. We
1Of course, since effort choice is not endogenous in the Jackson and Wolinsky co-author
model, their model is an one-stage model where individuals only choose partners knowing
that each individual will equalise effort across partnerships.
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assume, similarly to the Jackson-Wolinsky model, that there is an egalitar-
ian rule according to which each partner’s utility/payoff from a partnership
is equal to the total production of the partnership. In other words, it is
assumed that the product of each partnership is a non-rival public good for
the two partners but perfectly excludable from everyone else, amounting to
no spill-overs across partnerships. An agent’s payoff will, therefore, be the
sum of the product of all of her partnerships, net of the total cost of link
formation she incurs:
Πi(s,m) =
∑
j∈N−{i}
F (eij , eji)− diµ¯ where m(g(s)) = e (2.3)
We note here that this production function specification includes, through
the additive term, the potential for free-riding on the other partner’s effort,
since one agent receives the non-synergistic product of the other agent even
if she does not exert much effort herself in that partnership. However, it also
allows for incentives to specialise in a partnership as agents will allocate their
effort in order to maximise the total synergistic product they receive from
their partnerships.
We next introduce the definition of an equilibrium of the two-stage game:
Definition 12. The pair of strategy profiles (s∗,m∗) is a Subgame Perfect
Bilateral Equilibrium (SPBE) iff:
(i) For all i ∈ N , for all mi, and for all s,
Πi(s,m
∗) ≥ Πi(s,mi,m∗−i). (2.4)
(ii) For all i ∈ N , for all si,
Πi(s
∗,m∗) ≥ Πi(si, s∗−i,m∗). (2.5)
(iii) For all pairs of players {i, j} ∈ N , for all (si, sj):
Πi(s
∗,m∗) ≥ Πi(si, sj , s∗−ij ,m∗) (2.6)
or,
Πj(s
∗,m∗) ≥ Πj(si, sj , s∗−ij ,m∗). (2.7)
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As in any subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game, players an-
ticipate that an equilibrium will be played in the second stage of the game.
The equilibrium payoffs of the second stage game become the payoffs of the
first stage game. Equation 2.4 imposes the requirement that the second stage
strategy profile m∗ must be a Nash Equilibrium of the second stage game
at all possible subgames; that is no matter which graph is formed in the
first stage, players’ choice of effort allocation must be a Nash Equilibrium
in that subgame. Equation 2.5 imposes the requirement that no individual
has a strictly profitable unilateral deviation in the first stage, assuming that
players will use m∗ in the second stage. However, Nash Equilibrium has
a well-known problem in any network formation game - the empty graph
can always be supported as a Nash Equilibrium since bilateral consent is
required to form a link. Following much of the literature on network forma-
tion, we allow pairs of players to deviate together in the first stage in order
to correct for this problem. Equations 2.6 and 2.7 impose the requirement
that no pair of individuals should be able to deviate jointly with both of
them becoming strictly better off.
2.3 Efficiency and Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equi-
libria
In this section, we discuss the extent to which Subgame Perfect Bilateral
Equilibria can support the efficient outcome(s) of the overall game under
various assumptions on the synergy function f .
We first start with a lemma which will be useful subsequently and is also
of some independent interest. The lemma shows that every second stage
game is actually a potential game.2
We remind the reader that a normal form game (N,S,Π) is an exact
potential game if there is a function P : S → R such that for all s ∈ S, for
all i ∈ N , for all s′i ∈ Si,
P (s)− P (s′i, s−i) = Πi(s)−Πi(s′i, s−i) (2.8)
Lemma 1. For all g ∈ G, the second stage game is an exact potential game.
2See Monderer and Shapley (1996) [34].
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Proof. Fix any g. Consider the following candidate potential function:
P (g, e) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j>i,j∈Ni(g)
F (eij , eji) (2.9)
To check that this is indeed a potential, consider strategy profiles m and
(m′i,m−i). Let m(g) = e and m
′
i(g) = e
′
i. Then,
Πi(g,m(g))−Πi(g,m′i(g),m−i(g)) =
∑
j∈Ni(g)
[
F (eij , eji)− F (e′ij , eji)
]
= P (g, e)− P (g, e′) (2.10)
This shows that P is a potential function and establishes the lemma.
We use the following definition of efficiency:
Definition 13. A pair of strategy profiles (s,m) is efficient iff for all g′ ∈ G,
for all e′ ∈ E,
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni(g(s))
F (eij , eji) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni(g′)
F (e′ij , e
′
ji) if µ(g) ≤ µ(g′)
>
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni(g′)
F (e′ij , e
′
ji)otherwise. (2.11)
So, (s,m) is efficient if it maximises total output produced across all
possible networks and all possible feasible allocations of effort in the second
stage. This is, of course, stronger than the notion of Pareto efficiency, but is
in line with the literature on networks starting from Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) [31]. The definition of efficiency given here assumes that the cost
of link formation is very small. Thus, if µ(g) > µ(g′), then even a small
difference in second-stage output is sufficient to outweigh the cost difference
in network formation.
Notice that a pair (g, e) can be efficient only if the vector of effort allo-
cation decisions e maximises output given that the network g has formed.
Given the form of the potential function P , it is clear that e must then
maximise the value of the potential at g. Moreover, we know that if a strat-
egy profile is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of a potential game, it is a
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stationary point of the potential. 3
Since the nature of the results will depend on the specification of the
synergy function f , it will be convenient to conduct the discussion separately
for convex and concave synergy functions.
2.3.1 The Strictly Convex Case
For this section, we suppose that the synergy function f is strictly convex
in the effort inputs:
Assumption 2.1: Let the synergy function be f(eij , eji) = z(eij)z(eji)
with z(.) being increasing and strictly convex.
In this case, we prove that the efficient network is supported as a Sub-
game Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium. The following theorem provides a formal
statement.
Theorem 1. Let f satisfy Assumption 2.1. Then,
(i) If n is even, the unique efficient pair of strategy profiles (s,m) must be
such that g(s) consists of n2 components, each component containing a
pair of individuals. Moreover, m(g(s)) = e with eij = 1 iff ij ∈ g(s).
(ii) If n is odd, the unique efficient pair of strategy profiles (s,m) must be
such that g(s) consists of n−32 components each containing a pair of
individuals, and another minimally connected component q = {ij, jk}.
Moreover, m(g(s)) = e is chosen so that for all i ∈ N , eij = 1 for
some j ∈ Ni(g). 4
(iii) In all cases above, the efficient pair of strategies is a Subgame Perfect
Bilateral Equilibrium.
(iv) Moreover, there cannot be a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium
which is not efficient.
Proof. Suppose for some i ∈ N and some feasible effort allocation vector,
| J = {j | eij > 0} |> 1, J ⊆ Ni,
∑
j∈J eij ≤ 1, and assume for simplicity
3An interior Nash Equilibrium will be, for a general f , a stationary point of the poten-
tial. Also, there may be other Nash equilibria which are at the boundary of the strategy
space, with some neighbours setting eij = eji = 0.
4This is straightforward for all i if di(g) = 1. For j ∈ N(q) for whom dj(g) = 2, choose
any l ∈ Nj(g) and set ejl = 1.
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that eji = e for all j ∈ J . Consider a feasible reallocation of effort such that,
for some j∗ ∈ J , e′ij∗ = 1, and e
′
ij = 0 for all other j ∈ J j 6= j∗. Then, from
strict convexity of f , it follows that
f(1, e) >
∑
j∈J
f(eij , e). (2.12)
This immediately establishes that total synergy output is maximised if each
i sets eij = 1 for some j where eji = 1. This is possible for all i iff n is even.
So, (i) follows since the total cost of link formation is also minimised at the
isolated pairs network.
Now, suppose n is odd. It is again easy to check that total synergy
output is maximised when pairs of i, j put eij = eji = 1. This is possible
only for n−12 pairs. Suppose µ¯ < 1. Consider the component q where
dj(q) = 2. Suppose ejk = ekj = 1, eij = 1, eji = 0. Then, i and j produce no
synergistic output but i contributes output of 1 unit. If µ¯ < 1, it is efficient
for i and j to form the partnership. Hence, (ii) is true.
Suppose (s∗,m∗) is an efficient pair of strategies. If n is even,
Πi(s
∗,m∗) = 2 + f(1, 1)− µ¯ for all i ∈ N (2.13)
It is easy to check that no pair of individuals can deviate and get a strictly
higher payoff.
Suppose n is odd. Again, (n− 2) individuals attain the payoff specified
in equation 2.13. One individual has two links i.e. is the centre of a line
where both partners exert all effort to her but she exerts all effort in one of
the two partnerships. Therefore, the central agent attains the payoff:
Πi(s
∗,m∗) = 3 + f(1, 1)− 2µ¯ > 2 + f(1, 1)− µ¯ (2.14)
the second inequality following from µ¯ < 1. The remaining individual ob-
tains the payoff 1−µ¯ > 0 for µ¯ < 1. This agent would profit from a deviation
to an isolated pair but there is no other agent who would become strictly
better off from deviating with him. This establishes (iii).
To complete the proof of the theorem, suppose (s,m) is a Subgame
Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium pair of strategies but is not efficient.
Let g be the network formed in the first stage of the game. We recall
that the second stage game is a potential game. Moreover, since f is strictly
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convex, the potential is also strictly convex. If g consists of components
each containing pairs (i, j), it is straightforward that the unique second
stage payoff is maximised at the efficient effort level where eij = eji = 1.
Suppose now that g is such that for at least two agents i, j
Πk(s,m) < 2 + f(1, 1)− µ¯ for k = i, j (2.15)
Then, i and j can deviate in the first stage, form the bilateral partnership
and achieve the payoff given in equation 2.13.
So, at most one agent can fail to attain this payoff.
Suppose that n is even. Note that whatever the structure of g, the upper
bound on total synergy output is n2 f(1, 1). Moreover, convexity of f also
implies that each i will want to put eij = 1 for some j ∈ Ni(g) such that
eji > 0. It is now straightforward to check that (iv) is true for n even.
Now suppose n is odd. The same argument as before establishes that
n−3
2 bilateral partnerships must form. This leaves some set {i, j, k} of agents.
Suppose k is isolated. Our specification of the production function implies
that k cannot produce anything unless he is in a partnership (even if his
partner does not eventually contribute any effort in the partnership). So, k
will form a partnership with either i or j.
But, even when no agent is isolated, convexity implies that the unique
Nash Equilibrium must involve specialisation of effort.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
This theorem provides a contrast to the incompatibility of efficiency and
stability in the co-author model in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31]. Given
the difference in the frameworks, it is worth asking whether the difference in
results is due to the fact that here individuals can choose effort endogenously
or whether the difference can be explained by strict convexity of the synergy
function. The results in this section and the next ones suggest that, while
the form of the synergy function may play an important role, not allowing
the individuals to choose effort allocations is also crucial in precipitating the
incompatibility results.
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2.3.2 The Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) Co-author model
In this section, we consider the special case where the synergy function has
the following form:
f(eij , eji) = eijeji (2.16)
In this case, the marginal product of own effort is a linear function of the
effort of the other partner. This is of course the case studied by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) [31] and is particularly interesting in view of the difference
in results. We assume in this section that n is even. The following theorem
formally states that the network where all agents are connected in pair
components, with each agent hence exerting all of their effort endowment
in their unique partnership, is the unique efficient and the unique Subgame
Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium network.
Theorem 2. Suppose n is even and the synergy function is f(eij , eji) =
eijeji. Then,
(i) Any efficient pair of strategies (s,m) must be of the form where g(s)
consists of n2 components, each component containing a pair i, j and
with eij = eji = 1.
(ii) Any efficient pair of strategies can be supported as a Subgame Perfect
Bilateral Equilibrium.
(iii) Moreover, there cannot be a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium
which is not efficient.
Proof. The proof of (i) is available in Jackson and Wolinsky [31]. So, we
prove only (ii) and (iii).
We, first, show (ii) i.e. that the efficient network g of n2 pair components
with eij = eji = 1 is a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium.
Consider any efficient profile (s,m) with g = g(s). Suppose ij ∈ g.
Clearly, neither i nor j has any unilateral deviation which is profitable. So,
consider a bilateral deviation by say i and k where ik /∈ g. Let g′ = g + ik
be the new network and consider the component q consisting of i, j, k and l
where ij, kl ∈ g.
In the second stage of the game, consider any allocation in g′ with 0 <
eik < 1, 0 < eki < 1, hence 0 < eij < 1, 0 < ekl < 1. But we know that
eji = elk = 1. Therefore, agent i has the incentive to unilaterally deviate
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by decreasing effort eik and increasing eij in order to increase total synergy.
These deviation incentives exist until eij = 1, eik = 0. The same holds for
agent k. Therefore, no allocation with positive effort by i, k in all links
can be a Nash Equilibrium. Since agents will expect this when making link
decisions, the ik link will not be formed. Therefore, the efficient network of
pair components is a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium.
We next show that the efficient network g is the unique Subgame Perfect
Bilateral Equilibrium. The proof of this is very similar to the corresponding
statement in the previous theorem.
First, note that any pair of agents i, j can deviate in the first stage of the
game, form the bilateral partnership and obtain payoff equal to the output:
Π = 1 + 1 + eijeji − µ¯ = 3− µ¯ (2.17)
So, if (s,m) is to be a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium, at most one
agent can get a strictly lower payoff. Now take any equilibrium (s,m). Let g
be the network formed through s. If g has a component with an odd number
of nodes, then there must be at least two such components since n is even.
It is easy to check that at lest one player gets strictly less payoff than Π in
an odd component. But, then there will be two such players since there are
at least two such components.
Hence, g can have only even components. Let h be a component of g
with N(h) being even. Given f(eij , eji) = eijeji, synergy output in h is
maximised when N(h) is partitioned into pairs {i, j} with eij = eji = 1.
Note that if h is not a pair, then at least two agents have at least two
links, and so pay a linking cost of at least 2µ¯. So, the net payoff of at least
two agents must be less than Π and hence g cannot be a Subgame Perfect
Bilateral Equilibrium.
This result demonstrates the difference brought about by making the
choice of effort endogenous, since the form of the synergy function is identical
to that used by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) [31] in their co-author model.
In the latter, i and k gain by forming the link between themselves because
they are committed to devoting half of their effort to this link when they have
only two neighbours. This commitment arises because the individuals cannot
choose their allocation of effort, since it is exogenously specified that all
individuals divide their endowment equally across all neighbours. However,
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equal division of effort is not necessarily a Nash Equilibrium. The proof of
the above theorem rests on the simple observation that if j devotes 1 unit
to the link with i, and k only 1/2, then i will want to put more effort on the
link with j.
2.3.3 The Strictly Concave Case
We next study the case when the synergy function f is strictly concave in
the effort inputs. It then follows that the production function F will also be
strictly concave.
Assumption 2.2: The synergy function f(eij , eji) = z(eij)z(eji) is in-
creasing in each argument, differentiable and strictly concave.
Under this assumption, the following theorem formally states and proves
that the unique efficient network, consisting of the complete network with
equal effort division among links, is also a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equi-
librium network. This is not, however, unique as there are other, inefficient
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium networks.
Theorem 3. Let F be defined as above and µ be sufficiently small.
(i) The complete network with equal effort allocation (gc, e
∗) is the unique
efficient network.
(ii) The efficient network is supported as a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equi-
librium.
(iii) If n > 2, there can be other inefficient Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equi-
libria.
Proof. Assume that the link formation cost µ is small enough that the saving
on the cost from forming less than n−1 links does never compensate for the
loss in total output or total individual output.
Also, assume n > 2 since (i) and (ii) are are obviously true when n = 2.
(i) Consider any pair (g, e) where g ⊂ gc. First, note that there is an
effort allocation vector e˜ in gc such that e˜ij = eij for all ij ∈ g. This implies
that total output must be maximised in gc.
Second, we show that total output in gc is maximised at e
∗.
Let e∗∗ be the efficient effort allocation vector in gc. We establish that
e∗ = e∗∗ in two steps.
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(a) If e∗∗ is interior (that is e∗∗ij > 0 for all ij), then e
∗∗ = e∗.
(b) e∗∗ must be interior.
To establish (a), note that for all i,
∂f(eij ,eji
∂eij
= ∂f(eik,eki∂eik for all j, k 6= i
only at e∗. Since the equality of i’s marginal productivity across links must
be a necessary condition for efficiency in the interior, this establishes (a).
Part (b) follows straightaway from the assumption of strict concavity.
For suppose eij = eji = 1. If there is another pair k, l such that ekl = elk = 1,
then choose e′ such that each of {i, j, k, l} puts in effort 1/2 on two of the
links amongst themselves, such that each of the four edges has effort pairs
(1/2, 1/2). Since
2f(1/2, 1/2) > f(1, 1), (2.18)
e cannot be efficient. If only i, j put effort exclusively on one link, then from
arguments in part (a) above, all others (and there must be at least three
others), equalise effort across all of the remaining (n−3) links. Again, there
is a feasible reallocation of effort which increases total output due to the
strict concavity of f .
This establishes (i).
(ii) Since the second-period game is a strictly concave potential game, the
potential must be maximised at e∗. This must then be a Nash Equilibrium
of the second period game given that gc has formed.
In order to show that there is some (gc,m
∗) with m∗(gc) = e∗ that is
a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium, we need to show that possible
deviations in the first period cannot be profitable.
It is easy to show that unilateral link deletion cannot be profitable for
any individual. Suppose i, j deviate and cut some links so that the network
g forms. Consider e such that
ekl =
1
n− 3 for all k, l 6∈ {i, j}
epq = 1 for pq ∈ {ij, ji} (2.19)
Then, e is a Nash Equilibrium, given that g has formed, since no unilateral
deviation can increase synergy output. Noting that, from strict concavity,
f(1, 1) < (n− 1)f( 1
n− 1 ,
1
n− 1) (2.20)
it is now obvious that (gc,m
∗) is a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium;
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each deviating pair i, j assumes that the second period equilibrium will be
of the form e.
(iii) Inefficient equilibria can be supported as Subgame Perfect Bilateral
Equilibria. Consider a pair components network g for n even, with ij /∈ g.
This network results in a total production of n(n−1)2 F (
1
n−1 ,
1
n−1), which is
inefficient. Consider a bilateral deviation where the two agents i, j form a
new link. In the new network, there is a (second period) Nash Equilibrium
in which eij = eji = 0. So, the first period bilateral deviation by i, j is not
profitable and hence g is a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium.
In conclusion, even in the existence of inefficient equilibrium networks,
the uniquely efficient network and effort provision is always supported in a
Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium of the game. Overall, in this chapter,
we have shown, not only that efficiency is always achievable as an equilibrium
outcome, but that, for a fairly large family of production functions, stability
and efficiency always agree.
38
Chapter 3
Endogenous Formation of
Bilateral Partnerships with
Heterogeneous Types
3.1 Introduction
In this section, we look at the case of heterogeneous agent productivity. It
is easy to see that, as in Chapter 2, the efficient network is a Subgame Per-
fect Bilateral Equilibrium. The main purpose of this chapter is to perform
comparative statics in order to observe changes in relative specialisation to
the high-type partnership, as the relative productivity ratio and the degree
of concavity vary. Although we focus on a model with four agents, it is
still very difficult to get analytically tractable closed form solutions. That
is why we take recourse to simulations that allow us, however, to draw some
intuitive conclusions as to agents equilibrium behaviour.
3.2 The Model
We consider a population of four agents N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Two agents have
a high productivity (ti = h) and two have a low productivity (ti = l), with
productivity levels being perfectly observable.
In the first stage of the game, the agents play a simultaneous-move
linking-game, identical to the one of Chapter 2, where they form bilat-
eral but non-exclusive partnerships, bearing a small symmetric cost per
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link µ¯. Each action profile s = (s1, ..., s4) will, therefore, induce a net-
work g(s) = (gij)i,j∈N . Keeping the same notation as in Chapter 2 unless
otherwise specified, we denote by G(2, 2) the set of all possible networks that
can be formed by nh = 2 high and nl = 2 low productivity players.
In the second stage, after observing network g(s), agents simultaneously
announce their effort provision decisions. An action for player i in the second
stage of the game will, therefore, be an effort provision decision ei(s) among
all of i’s partnerships, with eij(s) ∈ [0,+∞). Effort allocation decisions,
once made, are perfectly observable by all.
Agents face an endogenous quadratic cost of exerting effort: ci =
(
∑N
j=1 eij)
2
2 .
This captures the fact that exerting an additional unit of effort will have an
increasing additional cost, irrespective of the partnership to which this effort
is allocated. The cost function is the same for low and high productivity
types.
Each partnership {ij} results in the production of some output according
to the following synergy production function:
f(eij , eji) = f(eijeji) = (eijeji)
γ = (tieijtjeji)
γ , (3.1)
where e gives effort in efficiency units and γ > 0.
We assume that the agents enjoy the full product of each partnership.
Therefore, payoffs for each agent in the two-stage game, ignoring the cost of
link-formation, will be equal to the sum of the product of each partnership
ij, minus the cost of effort provision among all of their partnerships:
Πi(ei,
∑
j∈N−{i}
ej) =
∑
j∈N−{i}
(eijeji)
γ −
(
∑
j∈N−{i} eij)
2
2
. (3.2)
We use the same equilibrium concept used in Chapter 2: A Subgame
Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium of the two-stage game will prescribe for each
player i ∈ N : (i) a linking strategy si, with strategy profile s defining net-
work g, and (ii) a Nash Equilibrium effort strategy mi(g) in the second stage
of the game for any feasible network g ∈ G. At a Subgame Perfect Bilat-
eral Equilibrium, no type of player will have a strictly profitable unilateral
deviation in the effort provision stage of any network that can be formed.
Moreover, no type of player will be able to strictly increase payoffs by de-
viating unilaterally in the first stage, assuming that players will play Nash
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Equilibrium efforts in the second stage. Finally, no pair of players, consisting
of any combination of types, will be able to deviate jointly and be strictly
better off.
Before proceeding, however, we will present some benchmark cases that
provide some initial intuition related to the more complex comparative stat-
ics that will follow in the subsequent sections. As a first benchmark case,
and in order to highlight the role of cost convexity in the co-determination
of effort provision, consider the complete network where all links are formed
and assume instead that the cost was linear, e.g. taking the form ci =∑
j∈N−{i} δeij . In this case, the marginal cost of effort provision in each link
is constant and equal to δ. Therefore, the effort exerted in each partnership
will not be affected by the effort that the agent exerts elsewhere in the net-
work. Agent i, for γ < 12 , will hence simply choose a high enough effort eij
so that the marginal product of the ij partnership γeγ−1ij (titjeji)
γ is equated
with the fixed marginal cost δ.
But as the fixed marginal cost is the same for all agents, this means that
marginal products of a link will also be equal:
γeγ−1ij (titjeji)
γ = δ = γeγ−1ji (titjeij)
γ ⇒ eij = eji (3.3)
Therefore, we get that effort provision levels in a partnership will be equal
for the two agents, irrespective of their types.
Considering now that there are three types of partnerships as ti ∈ {h, l},
the above means that for linear cost we can easily derive closed form solutions
for the three effort levels {ehh, ell, e˜ = elh = ehl} exerted in the partnerships
between two high, two low, and one high and one low type, respectively. In
particular, we derive:
{ehh = ( δ
γ
h−2γ)
1
2γ−1 , ell = (
δ
γ
l−2γ)
1
2γ−1 , e˜ = (
δ
γ
(hl)−γ)
1
2γ−1 } (3.4)
In order to perform comparative statics, an easy manipulation gives:{
e˜ =
γ
δ
1
1−2γ
(hl)
γ
1−2γ , ehh =
γ
δ
1
1−2γ
(h)
2γ
1−2γ , ell =
γ
δ
1
1−2γ
(l)
2γ
1−2γ
}
(3.5)
It is then straightforward to see that an increase in the fixed marginal
cost δ will cause all Nash Equilibrium effort provision levels to drop. We
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can also observe that the effort exerted by the two agents in a partnership
will be higher, the higher the product of their types, i.e. ehh > e˜ > ell, and
that these differences become larger, the larger the ratio of productivity of
the high type over that of the low type. For example, e˜ehh = (
l
h)
γ
1−2γ < 1
for l < h and γ1−2γ > 0, with the ratio becoming smaller the smaller
l
h is.
Finally, the effect of an increase in the concavity of the production function,
i.e. a drop in γ, on the equilibrium effort levels can be positive or negative
depending on the exact values of the parameters.
In order to get some insight on the role of concavity, assume for simplicity
that h > l = 1 and δ = 1, while we assume still that γ < 12 . Then the
equilibrium effort levels are given by the simplified expressions:
{
ell = γ
1
1−2γ , e˜ = γ
1
1−2γ h
γ
1−2γ = ellh
γ
1−2γ , ehh = γ
1
1−2γ h
2γ
1−2γ = ellh
2γ
1−2γ
}
(3.6)
We notice that ehh, e˜ are functions of ell so we start with an examination
1
of ∂ell∂γ . Using the formula for the derivative of a function of γ in the power
of another function of γ, we get:
∂ell
∂γ
=
γ
1
1−2γ
1− 2γ
[
2 ln γ
1− 2γ +
1
γ
]
(3.7)
We can confirm that this derivative has a root γ∗ ∈ (0, 12) such that
for all γ > γ∗, ∂ell∂γ < 0 and for all γ < γ
∗, ∂ell∂γ > 0. This means that
for concave enough production functions (small enough γ), the derivative is
negative; hence a further increase in the degree of concavity by a drop in γ
will cause the exerted effort in the ll partnership to increase in equilibrium.
On the contrary, for low enough degrees of concavity (large enough γ), the
derivative is positive; hence an increase in the degree of concavity by a fall
in γ will cause the exerted effort in the ll partnership to fall in equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is the following: whenever the production
function becomes more concave, the l-agent has an incentive to drop their
exerted effort level. But a drop in the effort of one partner will further
incentivise the other to drop their exerted effort further in equilibrium, neg-
atively affecting payoffs. For high enough degrees of concavity, the incentives
1In this and all subsequent sections, Wolfram Alpha has been used whenever necessary
for calculations and for the production of graphs.
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to prevent one’s partners from decreasing the effort they exert are dominant,
while for low enough degrees of concavity incentives to drop own effort levels
due to the increase in concavity dominate instead.
Note, finally, that for a low enough γ, the derivatives of e˜ and ehh also
become negative, but the thresholds for this are lower than γ∗, with the
threshold for ehh to become negative being the lowest.
As a second benchmark case, assume the effort provision cost is quadratic
but the synergy function has γ = 1, so that the marginal product of effort
in any link is linear in the exerted effort of the other partner and equal for
i to bibjeji. Then the first order condition for any agents in any connected
network is:
bibjeji =
∑
j∈N−i
eij (3.8)
We can show that under this specification there does not always exist an
interior Nash Equilibrium such that agents of symmetric type and network
position have symmetric effort provision strategies. As the simplest example,
consider the isolated pairs. Taking first order conditions and imposing ex
post symmetry, we get ehh = h
2ehh and ell = l
2ell. This is only feasible for
h = l = 1 i.e. for homogeneous types.
Third, we investigate the case where the production function is of Cobb-
Douglas form with constant returns to scale i.e. when γ = 12 . In this case, we
show that there is not a unique Nash Equilibrium for the complete network.
Taking first order conditions and imposing ex post symmetry for each type,
normalising h > l = 1, we get:
ehh + 2ehl = γh
γeγ−1hl e
γ
lh = γh
2γe2γ−1hh (3.9)
ell + 2elh = γh
γeγ−1lh e
γ
hl = γe
2γ−1
ll (3.10)
For γ = 12 these give:
elh = hehl (3.11)
γh = ehh + 2ehl (3.12)
γ = ell + 2elh (3.13)
This is a system of three constraints with four unknowns. It does not have
a unique solution but infinitely many: choose any ehl, elh such that elh =
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hehl ≥ 0, ehl ≤ hγ, elh ≤ γ. Then there are ehh, ell that satisfy the above,
with ehh = hγ − 2ehl > ell = γ − 2hehl.
As a fourth special case, we investigate what happens for 12 < γ < 1 i.e
when the production function is not strictly concave but is a Cobb-Douglas
with increasing returns to scale. For the first order conditions of the high
type, using ex-post symmetry and normalising h > l = 1, in the complete
network, we get:
∂(γh2γe2γ−1hh )
∂ehh
= γh2γ(2γ − 1)e2(γ−1)hh > 0. (3.14)
This means that if the two high types could coordinate and increase efforts
together, the marginal product of the hh link would keep increasing so full
specialisation would be optimal. Therefore, a bilateral deviation to the hh
isolated pair would be strictly profitable. We can, moreover, show that
the Nash Equilibrium effort level in the hh pair would be higher than the
equilibrium effort level in an hl isolated pair:
ephh = (γh
2γ)
1
2(1−γ) > eplh = e
p
hl = (γh
γ)
1
2(γ−1) (3.15)
But, starting from any other network, a pair of agents will always have in-
centives to bilaterally deviate and fully specialise in the link between them.
Therefore, we can show that the unique Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilib-
rium will be the hh ll isolated pairs network with ephh = (γh
2γ)
1
2(1−γ) , epll =
γ
1
2(1−γ) .
Finally, for γ > 1, it is straightforward to see that the marginal product
from any link keeps increasing in own effort so it will always exceed the
marginal cost:
∂(γeγ−1ij (titjeji)
γ)
∂eij
= γ(γ − 1)eγ−2ij (titjeji)γ > 0. (3.16)
Therefore, in this case, no interior solution exists for any network as all
players will exert infinite effort in order to maximise profits.
We will, from now on, focus on the case of strict concavity of f where
γ < 12 and convex costs as described above. We will investigate whether,
and under what conditions, links between high and low productivity agents
can arise in equilibrium for the two-stage game. We will also investigate
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the determinants of effort provision levels and perform some comparative
statics. In particular, we will try to uncover how productivity heterogeneity
and concavity affect the effort specialisation incentives of agents in their
high, relatively to their, low productivity partners.
3.3 The Second-stage Effort Provision Game
We show that the second stage game admits a strictly concave potential.
Therefore, for each network formed in the first stage of the game, there
is an interior Nash Equilibrium in effort in the second stage. Moreover,
this will be unique for reasons which are exactly the same as in Chapter 2.
We proceed to show that the complete network is then the unique efficient
network. We, finally, characterise Nash Equilibrium effort provision levels
for the complete network and the pairs network, and perform comparative
statics on the productivity heterogeneity and the concavity parameters.
3.3.1 Efficiency
In order to examine efficiency of Nash Equilibrium effort provision, we will
use the same in essence definition of efficiency that was used in Chapter 2
- namely (g, e) is efficient if the total output minus the cost of effort2 and
cost of network formation is maximised.
We begin our analysis by proving that the complete information second
stage game is an exact potential game, as defined in Chapter 2.
Lemma 2. For all g ∈ G, the second stage game under perfect information
is an exact potential game.
Proof. Fix any g. Consider the following candidate potential function:
P (g, e) =
∑
i∈N
 ∑
j>i,j∈Ni
f(e¯ij , e¯ji)−
(
∑
j∈N−{i} eij)
2
2
 (3.17)
To check that this is indeed a potential, consider strategy profiles m and
2In Chapter 2, there was no cost of effort since everyone had a fixed endowment.
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(m′i,m−i). Let m(g) = e and m
′
i(g) = e
′
i. Then,
Πi(g,m(g))−Πi(g,m′i(g),m−i(g)) =
∑
j∈N−{i}
[
f(e¯ij , e¯ji)− f(e¯′ij , e¯ji)
]
−
[
(
∑
j∈N−{i} eij)
2
2
− (
∑N
j=1 e
′
ij)
2
2
]
= P (g, e)− P (g, e′) (3.18)
This shows that P is a potential for this game and establishes the lemma.
We state without proof the following theorem, which proves that there
is a unique efficient network that consists of the complete network in its
unique interior Nash equilibrium in effort.3
Theorem 4. Consider the complete information exact potential game and
let µ¯ be sufficiently small in the first stage linking game. Then,
(i) There is a unique interior Nash Equilibrium e∗ in the complete network
gc where players allocate effort to equalise marginal synergy of links
with marginal cost of effort.
(ii) The network (gc, e
∗) is the unique efficient network.
3.3.2 Effort provision in the Complete network with concave
production and quadratic cost
In this section, we analyse how the Nash Equilibrium of the complete net-
work changes as we increase the productivity ratio b := h/l = h for l nor-
malised to 1, and the degree of concavity γ < 12 . In the unique interior Nash
Equilibrium of the complete network with 2 high and 2 low types, each type
will play a symmetric strategy by choosing effort levels in each link such that
the marginal product of own effort in each of their links is equal, and equal
to the marginal cost. The Nash Equilibrium will, therefore, be described
by four effort levels (ehl, ehh, elh, ell)
4 which solve the following system of
equations:
3The proof is omitted because it is almost identical to that of the corresponding theorem
in Chapter 2.
4For homogeneous types, h = l = 1 and in the unique interior Nash Equilibrium
eNEi = (
γ
|N|−1 )
1
2(1−γ) ∀i ∈ N , i.e. increasing in γ and decreasing in N .
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2ehl + ehh = γb
γeγlhe
γ−1
hl (3.19)
2ehl + ehh = γb
2γe2γ−1hh (3.20)
2elh + ell = γb
γeγhle
γ−1
lh (3.21)
2elh + ell = γe
2γ−1
ll (3.22)
Dividing (3.19) by (3.21), and manipulating (3.20) and (3.22), we get:
2ehl + ehh
2elh + ell
=
γbγeγlhe
γ−1
hl
γbγeγhle
γ−1
lh
=
elh
ehl
(3.23)
2ehl = γb
2γe2γ−1hh − ehh ⇒ ehl =
1
2
ehh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1] (3.24)
2elh = γe
2γ−1
ll − ell ⇒ elh =
1
2
ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1] (3.25)
Using (3.24) and (3.25), equation (3.23) becomes:
γb2γe2γ−1hh − ehh + ehh
γe2γ−1ll − ell + ell
=
1
2ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]
1
2ehh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]
⇒
b2γe2γhh
e2γll
=
γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1
γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1
⇒
e2γhh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1] = (
1
b
)2γe2γll [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1] (3.26)
Combining (3.19) and (3.20), we get:
γbγeγlhe
γ−1
hl = γb
2γe2γ−1hh ⇒ eγlheγ−1hl = bγe2γ−1hh (3.27)
which, using (3.24) and (3.25), gives:
bγe2γ−1hh = (
1
2
ehh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1])γ−1(
1
2
ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1])γ ⇒
e2γ−1hh = (
1
b
)γ(
1
2
)γ+γ−1eγ−1hh e
γ
ll[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]γ−1[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]γ ⇒
eγhh
[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]γ−1
= (
1
b
)γ(
1
2
)2γ−1eγll[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]γ ⇒
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e2γhh
[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]2(γ−1)
= (
1
b
)2γ(
1
2
)2(2γ−1)e2γll [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1])2γ . (3.28)
Equations (3.26) and (3.28) then provide a 2×2 system in ehh, ell. Combining
them, by dividing (3.26) with (3.28), we get:
e2γhh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1][γb2γe2(γ−1)hh − 1]2(γ−1)
e2γhh
= (
1
2
)2(1−2γ)[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]1−2γ ⇒
[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]2γ−1 = (
1
2
)2(1−2γ)[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]1−2γ ⇒
γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1 =
[
(
1
2
)2(1−2γ)[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]1−2γ
]1/(2γ−1)
γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1 = [22[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]−1] (3.29)
Substituting (3.29) back into (3.26), we get ehh as a function of ell:
e2γhh[2
2[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]−1] = (
1
b
)2γe2γll [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]⇒
ehh = (
1
2
)
1
γ
1
b
ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]
1
γ (3.30)
Finally, using constraint (3.30) to substitute for ehh in constraint (3.29), we
get an expression only in ell:
γb2γ
[
1
b
(
1
2
)
1
γ ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]
1
γ
]2(γ−1)
− 1 = [22[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]−1]⇒
1 = 22[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]−1[γb22
2(1−2γ)
γ e
2(γ−1)
ll [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]
3γ−2
γ − 1] (3.31)
In order to simplify 5 constraint (3.31), we can set y := γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1 to
get:
1
4
=
[
b22
2(1−2γ)
γ (y + 1)y
2(γ−1)
γ − 1
y
]
(3.32)
or
1 =
[
b22
2(1−γ)
γ
y + 1
y
2(1−γ)
γ
− 4
y
]
(3.33)
5Wolfram Mathematica has been used in this section.
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Notice that constraint (3.32) is a polynomial equation with unknown power
α := 2(1−γ)γ , γ < 1/2. There is, therefore, no general solution that would
provide us with a closed form solution for ell. What we can do instead is
form the implicit derivative ∂y∂b and study its sign for various values of the
concavity parameter γ.
From equations (3.24), (3.25) and (3.29) above, we can make the follow-
ing interesting observation for the equilibrium effort ratios elhell and
ehh
ehl
:
elh
ell
=
1
2
[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1] =
y
2
(3.34)
ehh
ehl
=
2
[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]
=
2
[22[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]−1]
=
y
2
(3.35)
Therefore, we have shown the following:
Proposition 1. In the unique interior Nash Equilibrium of the complete
network, the relative effort specialisation ratios between high and low type
neighbours will be equal for the two types:
elh
ell
=
ehh
ehl
(3.36)
As b changes, notice that the ratios will be changing in equilibrium ac-
cording to:
∂( elhell )
∂b
=
∂( ehhehl )
∂b
=
1
2
∂y
∂b
. (3.37)
Although it is impossible to get a closed-form solution for y, we can use
(3.33) to evaluate the derivatives of y with respect to b and γ. Since (y, b)
are positive for γ < 12 , α :=
2(1−γ)
γ > 2, (3.33) can be put in the following
useful alternative form:
(y + 4)yα = 2αb2y(y + 1) (3.38)
The derivatives then are:
∂y(b, α)
∂b
=
21+αby2(1 + y)
2ααb2y − 2αb2y2 + 2ααb2y2 − 4yα (3.39)
and
∂y(b, α)
∂α
=
2αb2y2(1 + y)(ln(2)− ln(y))
2ααb2y − 2αb2y2 + 2ααb2y2 − 4yα (3.40)
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with
∂
ehh
ehl
∂b =
1
2
∂y(b,α)
∂b and
∂
ehh
ehl
∂γ =
1
2
∂y
∂γ =
1
2
∂y
∂α
∂α
∂γ =
−1
γ2
∂y
∂α .
The numerator of ∂y(b,α)∂b is clearly positive for all values of (b, α) while
the numerator of ∂y(b,α)∂α will be positive for y > 2, negative for y < 2 and
zero for y = 2. 6
The denominator of both implicit partial derivatives is the same and can
be simplified to 2αb2(αy − y2 + αy2)− 4yα. However, no general conclusion
can be made about its sign as it seems dependent on the values of b, α and
y i.e. equilibrium ell.
We can, nevertheless, investigate the change in the effort ratios (captured
by the change in y = 2 ehhehl = 2
elh
ell
), using the constraint: (y + 4)yα =
2αb2y(y+1), by fixing b and taking various values for the concavity parameter
γ < 12 , and by fixing γ and taking various values for the productivity ratio
parameter b.
Figure 3.1: γ = 0.25
(i) γ = 1/4, b ∈ {1.2, 2, 4, 8, 16, 160}
For γ = 1/4, α = 2(1−γ)γ = 6 hence (y + 4)y
6 = 26b2y(y + 1) and
∂y(b)
∂b =
−(128by(1+y))
64b2(1+2y)−y5(24+7y) .
6y = 2 corresponds to all effort levels being equal in the Nash Equilibrium and can
only intuitively result for b = 1.
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The unique positive real solution is: for b = 1.2 y = 2.16254; for b = 2
y ≈ 2.69143; for b = 4 y ≈ 3.61901; for b = 8 y ≈ 4.85915; for b = 16
y ≈ 6.51174; and for b = 160 y ≈ 16.9617.
Evaluating the implicit derivative for some of these values, we get that
−(128by(1+y))
64b2(1+2y)−y5(24+7y) is approximately equal to: 0.566146 for (b = 2, y =
2.7); 0.385122 for (b = 4, y = 3.62); 0.173025 for (b = 16, y = 6.5);
0.0436069 for (b = 160, y = 16.96); and 0.000693128 for (b = 160, 000).
(ii) γ = 1/8, b ∈ {1.2, 2, 4, 8, 16, 160}
For γ = 1/8, α = 2(1−γ)γ = 14 hence (y + 4)y
14 = 214b2y(y + 1) and
∂y(b)
∂b =
−(32768by(1+y))
16384b2(1+2y)−y13(56+15y) .
The unique positive real solution is: for b = 1.2 y ≈ 2.05841; for b = 2
y ≈ 2.23131; for b = 4 y ≈ 2.48933; for b = 8 y ≈ 2.77711; for b = 16
y ≈ 3.09802; and for b = 160 y ≈ 4.45284.
Evaluating the implicit derivative for some of these values, we get that
−(32768by(1+y))
16384b2(1+2y)−y13(56+15y) is approximately equal to: 0.177532 for b = 2;
0.0302784 for b = 16; and 0.00441718 for b = 160.
Figure 3.2: γ = 0.125
(iii) γ = 1/32, b ∈ {1.2, 2, 4, 8, 16, 160}
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For γ = 1/32, α = 2(1−γ)γ = 62 hence (y + 4)y
62 = 262b2y(y + 1).
The unique positive real solution is: for b = 1.2 y ≈ 2.01206; for b = 2
y ≈ 2.04623; for b = 4 y ≈ 2.09352; for b = 8 y ≈ 2.14191; for b = 16
y ≈ 2.19142; and for b = 160 y ≈ 2.36424.
Figure 3.3: γ = 0.03125
We can also observe that the absolute value of the effort ratios is falling,
for the same productivity heterogeneity parameter b, as the production func-
tion becomes more concave i.e. for lower γ. This should become more evi-
dent by studying the effort ratios and the derivative with respect to α, for
example, for b = 2 and γ ∈ {25 , 18 , 140}. By evaluating the implicit derivative
of y with respect to α for b = 2, we get that it is equal to −2.19431 for
α = 3, −0.0182697 for α = 14, and −0.000478098 for α = 78.
We next produce a similar series of diagrams, by taking the value of b as
fixed and varying the degree of concavity γ.
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(iv) b = 2, γ ∈ {0.25, 0.125, 0.3125, 0.025}
Fix b = 2. Then, the unique positive real solution is: for γ = 1/4,
α = 6, y ≈ 4.5589, for γ = 1/8, α = 14, y ≈ 2.23131; for γ = 1/32,
α = 62, y ≈ 2.04623; for γ = 1/40, α = 78, y ≈ 2.03649.
Figure 3.4: b = 2
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(v) b = 2, γ ∈ {0.25, 0.125, 0.3125, 0.025}
Fix b = 8. Then, the unique positive real solution is: for γ = 1/4,
α = 6, y ≈ 4.85915, for γ = 1/8, α = 14, y ≈ 2.77711; for γ = 1/32,
α = 62, y ≈ 2.14191; for γ = 1/40, α = 78, y ≈ 2.11149.
Figure 3.5: b = 8
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(vi) b = 2, γ ∈ {0.25, 0.125, 0.3125, 0.025}
Fix b = 160. Then, the unique positive real solution is: for γ = 1/4,
α = 6, y ≈ 16.9617, for γ = 1/8, α = 14, y ≈ 4.45284; for γ = 1/32,
α = 62, y ≈ 2.36424; for γ = 1/40, α = 78, y ≈ 2.28312.
Figure 3.6: b = 160
Therefore, the numerical approximation results of this section suggest
that y(b) is an increasing, concave function. We can hence make the following
statement:
55
Statement 1. (i) The equilibrium high-over-low effort ratio is increas-
ing as the productivity ratio h/l = b increases. However, the rate of
increase is falling as b increases.
(ii) For fixed productivity ratio b, the equilibrium high-over-low effort ra-
tio is falling as the production function becomes more concave i.e. as
γ falls. This rate of decrease falls as the production function becomes
more concave, and approaches zero for highly concave production func-
tions.
Finally, with regards to total effort as b changes, for the total effort of
the low type TEl we get from (3.22) that:
∂TEl
∂b
= γ(2γ − 1)e2(γ−1)ll
∂ell
∂b
(3.41)
so, as b changes, TEl and ell will change in opposite directions, since (2γ −
1) < 0 and all other terms are positive. Moreover, from the definition of y
we get:
∂y
∂b
= γ2(γ − 1)e2γ−3ll
∂ell
∂b
(3.42)
which shows that y and ell change in opposite directions as b changes. There-
fore, we reach the following conclusion:
Statement 2. As the productivity ratio b increases, y increases so ell falls
but the Nash Equilibrium total effort of the low type TEl will increase overall:
∂TEl
∂b > 0. Therefore, Nash Equilibrium elh increases as b increases.
However, from (3.20) and (3.30), we can easily conclude that the deriva-
tive of total effort of the high type with respect to b is not necessarily mono-
tonic. As b increases, it is intuitive that ehh increases but ehl and TEh may
fall as the high-type needs to exert less real effort to be as efficient as before,
achieving the same results with a lower cost.
The intuition of this section is extendable to larger networks e.g. the
complete network consisting of equal and even numbers of high and low
productivity agents.7
7For linear cost, it is easy to show that the Nash Equilibrium high type effort speciali-
sation ratio is increasing in high type productivity b, tends to one as γ → 0 and tends to
infinity as γ → 1
2
.
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3.4 The Linking Game
In this section, we turn to the first stage linking game. We prove existence
and investigate uniqueness of a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium under
our assumptions for concave production and quadratic cost of effort. In
particular, we show that the efficient network and effort allocation strategy
profile are a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium of the game. 8
3.4.1 Existence and Efficiency of Subgame Perfect Bilateral
Equilibria
We are going to show that the complete network gc with the efficient effort
allocation profile is a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium of the game by
showing that no unilateral or bilateral deviation is strictly profitable for any
type(s) of players.
First, we consider an auxiliary network, the circular network where the
high and low types are connected and each has one hl link. We will refer
to this as the hhll circle gcir and show that a bilateral deviation to a pair
is not profitable for either the high or the low types. In appendix A, we are
able to derive closed form solutions for the hhll circle, which we then use
for the proofs of the following propositions.
We here provide a graph of the hhll circle and the associated Nash Equi-
librium effort levels.
Figure 3.7: hhll circle
Using y = [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1] = b
2γ
2−3γ , the Nash Equilibrium effort levels
ehh, ehl, elh, ell are:
ell = γ
1
2(1−γ) (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ) (3.43)
8For concave production and linear cost, it is trivial to show the unique Subgame
Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium network is the efficient network.
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elh = yell = γ
1
2(1−γ) b
2γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ) (3.44)
ehh = γ
1
2(1−γ) b
3γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ) (3.45)
ehl =
ehh
y
= γ
1
2(1−γ) b
γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ) (3.46)
Proposition 2. A deviation from the hhll circle to the hh pair is not prof-
itable.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 3. A deviation from the hhll circle to the ll pair is not prof-
itable.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The following then directly follows:
Corollary 1. A deviation from the hhll circle to the hl pair is not profitable
for the high type.
We, next, use the above two propositions to show that a deviation to
the hh pair or the ll pair is not profitable when starting from the complete
network gc.
Proposition 4. A deviation from the complete network to the hh pair or
the ll pair is not profitable.
Proof. It suffices to show that the high types and the low types make even
higher payoffs in the complete network than in the hhll circle.
Consider an effort allocation e˜ in the complete network where echh = e
cir
hh ,
ecll = e
cir
ll and e
c
hl =
ecirhl
2 , e
c
lh =
ecirlh
2 so that total effort and hence total cost
is the same for both types between the two networks.
Total production, however, strictly increases due to the concavity of the
production function:
f(ehl, elh) = f
(
2
ehl
2
, 2
elh
2
)
= 22γf
(ehl
2
,
elh
2
)
< 2f
(ehl
2
,
elh
2
)
(3.47)
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for γ < 12 . Therefore, total network payoff is strictly higher for the complete
network under e˜ than in the Nash Equilibrium of the hhll circle.
Due to the unique global maximum of the potential, we, moreover, know
that the Nash Equilibrium allocation e∗c of the complete network will result
in an even higher total network payoff than allocation e˜ :∑
i∈N
Πci (e
c
NE) >
∑
i∈N
Πci (e˜). (3.48)
It remains to be shown that individual payoffs, both for the high and the
low types, are strictly higher in (gc, ecNE) than in g
c, e˜ i.e. that:
Πch(e
c
NE) > Π
c
h(e˜) > Π
cir
h > Π
pair
h (3.49)
Πcl (e
c
NE) > Π
c
l (e˜) > Π
cir
l > Π
pair
l (3.50)
Using the first order conditions of the hhll circle, it is clear that alloca-
tion e˜ is not a Nash Equilibrium allocation in the complete network: The
marginal cost of the high agent, for example, will be equal for e˜ in the com-
plete network and the Nash Equilibrium allocation e∗cir of the circle. This
is, in turn, equal to the Nash Equilibrium marginal products for the high
type from the hh and hl links in the circle. Since the allocated efforts in the
hh link are the same under e˜ in gc and under the Nash Equilibrium of gcir,
these marginal products will also be equal. However, the marginal product
of the hl link in gc under e˜ will be lower, since both effort levels have been
halved. This is shown in the following:
MCch(e˜) = MC
cir
h (e
∗
cir) = ehl + ehh = MP
cir
hl (e
∗
cir) = γb
γeγlhe
γ−1
hl
= MP cirhh (e
∗
cir) = MP
c
hh(e˜) = γb
2γe2γ−1hh
< MP chl(e˜) = γb
γ(
elh
2
)
γ
(
ehl
2
)
γ−1
= γbγ21−2γeγlhe
γ−1
hl
(3.51)
since γ < 12 .
Therefore, to sum this up, in the complete network, the high type under
allocation e˜ has:
MCch(e˜) = MP
c
hh(e˜) < MP
c
hl(e˜) (3.52)
with the left hand side decreasing in ehh and the right hand side decreasing
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in ehl. Similarly, for the low type:
MCcl (e˜) = MP
c
ll(e˜) < MP
c
lh(e˜) (3.53)
Therefore, a unilateral deviation from e˜ is strictly profitable where the
high types increase ehl and drop ehh, which causes an increase in MP
c
hh and
a fall in MP clh. Similarly, the low types have an incentive to unilaterally
deviate by increasing elh and dropping ell.
From the definition of the production function, efforts are strategic com-
plements for all partners: ∂
2Πi
∂eij∂eji
> 0 for all types. Therefore, unilateral
deviations will reinforce each other and hence will all move towards the
same direction; an initial increase of ehl will be met with an increase of elh
and so on.
Unilateral deviation incentives are exhausted when the marginal prod-
ucts of all links of each type become equal and equal to the agent’s marginal
cost of effort provision. This happens at the unique interior equilibrium of
gc.
We, therefore, conclude that at the Nash Equilibrium of the complete
network, the effort allocations satisfy:
eNEhl > e˜hl, e
NE
lh > e˜lh. (3.54)
But this means that both the set of the low-types L and the set of the
high-types H receive more effort than in e˜ under the Nash Equilibrium of
gc.
Therefore, both the high and the low types are strictly better off in the
Nash Equilibrium of the complete network.
Proposition 5. Any other unilateral or bilateral deviation from the complete
network by the high types is payoff-dominated by the hhll circle or the hh
pair.
Proof. We consider all remaining bilateral deviations of the hight types,
omitting the trivial case where any agent is isolated in the post-deviation
network.
The remaining deviations for the high types, where the hh link is re-
tained, are: (i) h1 cuts one hl link, h2 cuts two hl links; (ii) h1 cuts zero
links, h2 cuts two hl links (iii) h1 cuts zero links, h2 cuts one hl link.
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(i) h1 cuts one hl link, h2 cuts two hl links:
This creates network 3D (see Figure 3.8). We will show that h2 will
be worse-off than in the hh isolated pair, which we have shown to be
worse than gc for all types.
It suffices to show that for any post-deviation network effort allocation
e′ with e′h2h1 = e
pair
hh , e
′
h1h2
< epairhh .
Assume not i.e. that e′h1h2 ≥ e
pair
hh = e
′
h2h1
and e′h1l1 > 0. But then,
for agent h1, MC
′
h1
= e′h1h2 + e
′
h1l1
> MCpairh1 = MP
pair
hh ≥ MP ′h1h2 ,
where MP ′h1h2 is the marginal product of agent h1 from the h1h2 link.
This is clearly not a Nash Equilibrium in the post-deviation network:
h1 needs to offer lower effort e
′
h1h2
< epairhh to maximise payoffs, unless
eh2h1 increases.
Therefore, for agent h2 to receive effort eˆh1h2 = e
pair
hh in the post-
deviation network, they have to offer higher effort eˆh2h1 > e
pair
hh . Con-
sider now this allocation eˆ in the hh pair. It is clear that h2 is strictly
worse-off, as they exert more effort but receive the same effort com-
pared with the Nash Equilibrium of the isolated hh pair.
We conclude that agent h2 will be strictly worse off in the post-
deviation network.
(ii) h1 cuts zero links, h2 cuts two hl links:
This creates network 4F . Similarly to (i), we conclude via contradic-
tion that h2 will be worse-off in the post-deviation network than in the
hh pair: In order to keep receiving the same effort as in the hh pair,
they would have to exert more effort themselves.
(iii) h1 cuts zero links, h2 cuts one hl link:
This creates network 5A. We show that agent h2 is worse-off than in
the hhll circle 4A, which we have shown to be worse than gc for both
types.
Assume otherwise, namely that h2 is equally well off in 5A as in 4A
by receiving and exerting the same effort level in each link. But for
h1 (similarly for l2) MPh1h2 remains the same so MCh1 needs to re-
main the same. So for any allocation in 5A with eh1l2 , el2h1 > 0, h1
needs to lower eh1l1 . Assume such an allocation exists that is a Nash
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Equilibrium of 5A and call it e′. Then an allocation eˆ which places
the same effort levels as e′ in the links of the hhll circle 4A will be a
Nash Equilibrium in 4A. This contradicts uniqueness of the interior
Nash Equilibrium in 4A.
Therefore, in order to receive the same effort from his links as in 4A,
h2 would need to exert more effort in his links in 5A than in 4A.
A similar argument shows that h2 cannot receive higher effort in 5A
than in 4A without exerting more to such a level that his total payoff
is again lower than in 4A.
We conclude that agent h2 is strictly worse-off in 5a than in 4a so also
worse than in gc.
Consider, finally, any h-type deviation where the hh link is cut: If
only the hh link is cut we are in 5C. The network is symmetric for
each type and the l-type set retains the same number of links and
receives higher effort from the h-types in the Nash Equilibrium of 5C.
Therefore, both low types are better off which means that both high
types are strictly worse off, since via efficiency of the full network total
payoffs fall.
The remaining cases are: (i)h1, h2 cut the hh link and h1 cuts one hl
link. Then we are in 4D and h1 is worse off than in the hl isolated
pair, which is worse than the hh isolated pair; (ii) h1, h2 cut the hh
link and one hl link each forming the hllh line 3B. They are then
worse off than in the hl pair, which is worse than the hh pair; (iii)
h1, h2 cut the hh link and one hl link each forming an l-centred star
3F : they are again worse off than in the hl pair, which is worse than
the hh pair.
Proposition 6. : Any other unilateral deviation and any bilateral deviation
from the complete network by the two low types or by one high and one low
type are not strictly profitable.
Proof. The proof follows identical steps as the proof of Proposition 3.5 and
is omitted.
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Combining results from the previous propositions, we have, therefore,
shown that:
Theorem 5. For a concave production function and a quadratic cost func-
tion, the efficient network (gc, eNE) is a Subgame Perfect Bilateral Equilib-
rium.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 4 and Propositions 3.4.1-
3.4.5
Finally, we show that the efficient network is not the unique Subgame
Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium network.
Proposition 7. The efficient network gc, eNE is not the unique Subgame
Perfect Bilateral Equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any other network g˜ ∈ G. If a single agent or a pair of
agents considering a deviation expect that a border Nash Equilibrium will
be played in the post-deviation network, with e.g. zero effort exerted in
the new link formed, then (g˜, e˜NE) is another Subgame Perfect Bilateral
Equilibrium of the game.
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Figure 3.8: List of Connected graphs
64
Bibliography
[1] Aumann, R., Myerson, R., 1988. ’Endogenous Formation of Links Be-
tween Players and Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value’,
In: Roth, A., (eds.), The Shapley Value, Cambridge University Press,
pages 175-191.
[2] Bloch, F., Dutta, B., 2009. ’Communication networks with endogenous
link strength’, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1),
pages 39-56.
[3] Bloch, F., Dutta, B., 2011. ’Formation of networks and coalitions’,
In: Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., Jackson, M.O., (eds.), Handbook of social
economics, North-Holland, vol. 1A, pages 729-780.
[4] Bloch, F., Jackson, M.O., 2006. ’Definitions of Equilibrium in Network
Formation Games’, International Journal of Game Theory, Springer,
vol. 34(3), pages 305-318.
[5] Bloch, F., Jackson, M.O., 2007. ’The formation of networks with trans-
fers among players’, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133,
pages 83-110.
[6] Cabrales, A., Calvo´-Armengol, A., Zenou, Y., 2007. ’Effort and Syn-
ergies in Network Formation’, mimeo., Universidad Carlos III, Univer-
sitat Autonoma de Barcelona, IUI Stockholm.
[7] Calvo´-Armengol, A., Ilkilic, R., 2009. ’Pairwise Stability and Nash
Equilibria in Network Formation’, International Journal of Game The-
ory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 51-79.
[8] Dutta, B., Ghosal, S., Ray, D., 2005. ’Farsighted Network Formation’,
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122, pages 143-164.
65
[9] Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O., 2003. ’On the Formation of Networks and
Groups’, In: Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O., (eds.), Models of the Strategic
Formation of Networks and Groups, Springer, pages 1-15.
[10] Dutta, B., Mutuswami, S., 1997. ’Stable networks’, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76, pages 322-344.
[11] Dutta, B., van den Nouweland, A., Tijs, S., 1998. ’Link formation
in cooperative situations’, International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 27, pages 245-256.
[12] Fosco, C., Mengel, F., 2011. ’Cooperation through imitation and ex-
clusion in networks’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, El-
sevier, vol. 35, pages 641-658.
[13] Goyal, S., 2007. ’Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of
Networks’, Princeton University Press.
[14] Goyal, S., 2016. ’Networks in Economics: A Perspective on the Liter-
ature’, In: Bramoulle´, Y., Galeotti, A., Rogers, B., (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Oxford University Press.
[15] Goyal, S., Joshi, S., 2003. ’Networks of collaboration in oligopoly’,
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol.43(1), pages 57-85.
[16] Goyal, S., Konovalov, A., Moraga Gonzales, J., 2008. ’Hybrid R and
D Networks’, Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT
Press, vol. 6(6), pages 1309-1338.
[17] Goyal, S., Moraga-Gonzalez, J.L., 2001. ’R and D Networks’, RAND
Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 686-
707.
[18] Goyal, S., Vega-Redondo, F., 2005. ’Network formation and social
coordination’, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50, pages
178-207.
[19] Goyal, S., Vega-Redondo, F., 2007. ’Structural holes in social net-
works’, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 460-
492.
66
[20] Grandjean, G., Mauleon, A., Vannetelbosch, V., 2011. ’Connections
among farsighted agents’, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley,
vol. 13, pages 935-955.
[21] Hiller, T., 2012. ’Peer effects in endogenous networks’, Bristol Eco-
nomics Working Papers, no. 12/633, University of Bristol.
[22] Jackson, M.O., 2005. ’The stability and efficiency of economic and
social networks’, In: Sertel, M., Koray, S., (eds.), Advanced Economic
Design, Springer-Verlag.
[23] Jackson, M.O., 2005. ’A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Sta-
bility and Efficiency’, In: Demange, G., Wooders, M., (eds.), Group
Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions, Cambridge
University Press.
[24] Jackson M.O., 2008. ’Social and Economic Networks’, Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
[25] Jackson, M.O., 2011. ’An Overview of Social Networks and Economic
Applications’, In: Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., Jackson, M.O., (eds.),
Handbook of Social Economics, vol. 1.
[26] Jackson, M.O., 2014. ’Networks in the Understanding of Economic Be-
haviors’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic
Association, vol. 28(4), pages 3-22.
[27] Jackson, M.O., 2016. ’The Past and Future of Network Analysis in
Economics’, In: Bramoulle´, Y., Galeotti, A., Rogers, B., (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Oxford University
Press.
[28] Jackson, M.O., van den Nouweland, A., 2005. ’Strongly Stable Net-
works’, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51, pages 420-
444.
[29] Jackson, M.O., Rogers, B., Zenou, Y., 2015. ’The economic conse-
quences of social network structure’, CEPR Discussion Paper 10406.
[30] Jackson, M.O., Watts, A., 2002. ’On the formation of interaction net-
works in social coordination games’, Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 41, pages 265-291.
67
[31] Jackson, M.O., Wolinsky, A., 1996. ’A Strategic Model of Social and
Economic Networks’, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1),
pages 44-74.
[32] Jackson, M.O., Zenou, Y., 2014. ’Games on Networks’, In: Young, P.,
Zamirin, S., (eds.), The Handbook of Game Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4.
[33] KG’Anig, M., Tessone, C.J., Zenou, Y., 2014. ’Nestedness in networks:
A theoretical model and some applications’, Theoretical Economics,
Econometric Society, vol. 9, pages 695-752.
[34] Monderer, D., Shapley, L.S., 1996. ’Potential Games’, Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143.
[35] Myerson, R.B., 1977. ’Graphs and Cooperation in Games’, Mathemat-
ics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2, pages 225-229.
[36] Vannetelbosch, V., Mauleon, A., 2016. ’Network Formation Games’,
In: Bramoulle´, Y., Galeotti, A., Rogers, B., (eds.), The Oxford Hand-
book on the Economics of Networks, Oxford University Press.
[37] Vega-Redondo, F., 2006. ’Building up social capital in a changing
world’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30,
pages 2305-2338.
[38] Vega-Redondo, F., 2016. ’Links and Actions in Interplay’, In:
Bramoulle´, Y., Galeotti, A., Rogers, B., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook
on the Economics of Networks, Oxford University Press.
[39] Watts, A., 2001. ’A Dynamic Model of Network Formation’, Games
and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34, pages 331-341.
68
Appendices
69
Appendix A
Effort provision in the hhll
Circular network
In this section, we repeat the analysis of the complete network for the hhll
circle. In the unique Nash Equilibrium of the hhll circle with two low and
two high types, each type will play a symmetric strategy, by choosing the
effort levels for each link such that the marginal products of own effort for
all links are equal and equal to the marginal cost. The Nash Equilibrium
will, therefore, be described, as in the complete network, by four effort levels
(ehl, ehh, elh, ell) which solve the following system:
ehl + ehh = γb
γeγlhe
γ−1
hl (A.1)
ehl + ehh = γb
2γe2γ−1hh (A.2)
elh + ell = γb
γeγhle
γ−1
lh (A.3)
elh + ell = γe
2γ−1
ll , (A.4)
where we have again normalised l = 1 and set h = b > 1.
Dividing (A.1) with (A.3), and manipulating (A.2) and (A.4), we get:
ehl + ehh
elh + ell
=
γbγeγlhe
γ−1
hl
γbγeγhle
γ−1
lh
=
elh
ehl
(A.5)
ehl = γb
2γe2γ−1hh − ehh ⇒ ehl = ehh[γb2γe2(γ−1)hh − 1] (A.6)
elh = e
2γ−1
ll − ell ⇒ elh = ell[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1] (A.7)
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Using (A.6) and (A.7), (A.5) becomes:
γb2γe2γ−1hh − ehh + ehh
γe2γ−1ll − ell + ell
=
ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]
ehh[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]
⇒
b2γe2γhh
e2γll
=
γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1
γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1
⇒
e2γhh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1] = (
1
b
)2γe2γll [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1] (A.8)
Combining (A.1) and (A.2), we get:
γbγeγlhe
γ−1
hl = γb
2γe2γ−1hh ⇒
eγlhe
γ−1
hl = b
γe2γ−1hh (A.9)
which, using (A.6) and (A.7), gives:
bγe2γ−1hh = (ehh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1])γ−1(ell[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1])γ ⇒
e2γ−1hh = (
1
b
)γ(eγ−1hh e
γ
ll[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]γ−1[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]γ ⇒
eγhh
[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]γ−1
= (
1
b
)γeγll[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]γ
and by squaring both sides, we get:
e2γhh
[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]2(γ−1)
= (
1
b
)2γe2γll [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1])2γ (A.10)
Constraints (A.8) and (A.10) then provide a 2× 2 system in ehh, ell. Com-
bining them by dividing (A.8) with (A.10) we get:
e2γhh[γb
2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1][γb2γe2(γ−1)hh − 1]2(γ−1)
e2γhh
= [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]1−2γ ⇒
[γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1]2γ−1 = [γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]1−2γ ⇒
γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1 = [[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]1−2γ ]1/(2γ−1)
γb2γe
2(γ−1)
hh − 1 = [γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]−1 (A.11)
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Substituting (A.11) back into (A.8), we get ehh as a function of ell:
e2γhh[[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]−1] = (
1
b
)2γe2γll [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]⇒
ehh =
1
b
ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]
1
γ (A.12)
Finally, using (A.12) to substitute for ehh in (A.11), we get an expression
only in ell:
γb2γ [
1
b
(ell[γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]
1
γ ]2(γ−1) − 1 = [[γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]−1]⇒
1 = [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1]−1[γb2e2(γ−1)ll [γe2(γ−1)ll − 1]
3γ−2
γ − 1] (A.13)
In order to simplify (A.13), we can set y := γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1 to get:
1 =
[
b2(y + 1)y
2(γ−1)
γ − 1
y
]
(A.14)
or
y = b
2γ
2−3γ (A.15)
with ∂y∂b =
2γ
2−3γ b
5γ−2
2−3γ > 0 and ∂y∂b =
4b
2a
2−3a lnb
(2−3a)2 > 0 for b > 1.
From (A.15), we can then solve directly for ell:
y = γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1 = b
2γ
2−3γ ⇒ ell = γ
1
2(1−γ) (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
(2(1−γ)) (A.16)
and use this to find the Nash Equilibrium values of ehh, ehl, elh.
More interestingly, from constraints (A.6), (A.7) and (A.11) above, we
observe that the equilibrium effort ratios elhell and
ehh
ehl
will, similarly to the
complete network, be equal:
elh
ell
= [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1] = y =
ehh
ehl
(A.17)
hence,
∂
elh
ell
∂b =
∂y
∂b =
∂
ehh
ehl
∂b > 0 and
∂
elh
ell
∂γ =
∂y
∂γ =
∂
ehh
ehl
∂γ > 0.
We can, therefore, conclude that in the unique interior Nash Equilibrium
of the hhll circle, the relative effort specialisation in the high type neighbour
will be equal for the two types:
elh
ell
=
ehh
ehl
(A.18)
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and will be increasing as productivity heterogeneity increases, or as the
production function becomes less concave.
This confirms the intuition and approximation results of the diagrams for
the complete network, for a simpler symmetric network where closed-form
solutions can be obtained.
Using y = [γe
2(γ−1)
ll − 1] = b
2γ
2−3γ , we can derive the exact Nash Equilib-
rium effort levels ehh, ehl, elh, ell as follows:
ell = γ
1
2(1−γ) (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ)
elh = yell = γ
1
2(1−γ) b
2γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ)
ehh = b
−1γ
1
2(1−γ) (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ) b
2
2−3γ = γ
1
2(1−γ) b
3γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ)
ehl = ehhy
−1 = γ
1
2(1−γ) b
γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−1
2(1−γ) (A.19)
As the difference in productivity between types increases, it can easily be
shown that ell falls and ehh, elh increase, while ehl is not necessarily mono-
tonic.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 3.4
In an isolated hh pair, both agents choose effort to maximise payoffs. Using
symmetry, we then get:
b2γγeγ−1h e
γ
h = 2
eh
2
⇒ e2γ−2h =
1
γb2γ
⇒
eh = (
1
γb2γ
)
1
2(γ−1) ⇒ eh = (γb2γ)
1
2(1−γ) (B.1)
Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium payoff for each high type is:
Πhhh = b
2γ(γb2γ)
2γ
2(1−γ) − (γb
2γ)
2
2(1−γ)
2
=
(2− γ)
2
γ
γ
1−γ b
2γ
1−γ (B.2)
Using the hhll circle’s Nash Equilibrium effort levels of section 3.4, we
can calculate the Nash Equilibrium payoff of the high type:
Πch = b
2γe2γhh + b
γeγhle
γ
lh −
(ehh + ehl)
2
2
= γ
γ
1−γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−γ
1−γ [b
4γ
2−3γ + b
2γ
2−3γ ]− 1
2
γ
1
1−γ b
2γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
1−2γ
1−γ (B.3)
Therefore, the difference in payoffs after a bilateral deviation from the
hhll circle to the isolated hh pair is:
∆Πh =
(2− γ)
2
γ
γ
1−γ b
2γ
1−γ − [γ γ1−γ (1 + b 2γ2−3γ ) −γ1−γ [b 4γ2−3γ + b 2γ2−3γ ]− 1
2
γ
1
1−γ b
2γ
2−3γ
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(1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
1−2γ
1−γ ] =
(2− γ)
2
γ
γ
1−γ b
2γ
1−γ − [γ γ1−γ b 2γ2−3γ (1 + b 2γ2−3γ ) −γ1−γ
[b
2γ
2−3γ +1−1
2
γ(1+b
2γ
2−3γ )]] = γ
γ
1−γ (
2− γ
2
)[b
2γ
1−γ−b 2γ2−3γ (1+b 2γ2−3γ ) 1−2γ1−γ ] (B.4)
Since the first and the second terms of the above product are positive
for any 0 < γ < 12 , it suffices to show that the third term in the brackets is
negative:
b
2γ
1−γ − b 2γ2−3γ (1 + b 2γ2−3γ ) 1−2γ1−γ < 0⇒
b
2γ
2−3γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
1−2γ
1−γ > b
2γ
1−γ ⇒
b
( 2γ
2−3γ− 2γ1−γ )(1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
1−2γ
1−γ > 1⇒
b
2γ(2γ−1)
(2−3γ)(1−γ) (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
1−2γ
1−γ > 1⇒
(b
2γ
2−3γ )
−(1−2γ)
1−γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
1−2γ
1−γ > 1⇒[
1 + b
2γ
2−3γ
b
2γ
2−3γ
] 1−2γ
1−γ
> 1 (B.5)
which holds for any b > 1, γ < 12 , since then the fraction in the brackets
is greater than one and the power it is set to is greater than zero.
We have, therefore, shown that a bilateral deviation from the hhll circle
to the isolated hh pair is not strictly profitable for the high types.
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Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3.5
In an isolated ll pair, both agents choose effort to maximise payoffs. Using
symmetry, we then get:
γe2γ−1l = 2
el
2
⇒ e2γ−2l =
1
γ
⇒ el = ( 1
γ
)
1
2(γ−1) ⇒ el = γ
1
2(1−γ) (C.1)
Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium payoff for each high type is:
Πlll = γ
2γ
2(1−γ) − γ
2
2(1−γ)
2
=
(2− γ)
2
γ
γ
1−γ (C.2)
Using the hhll circle’s Nash Equilibrium effort levels of section 3.4, we
can next calculate the Nash Equilibrium payoff of the low type:
Πcl = e
2γ
ll + b
γeγhle
γ
lh −
(ell + elh)
2
2
= γ
γ
1−γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
−γ
1−γ [1 + b
2γ
2−3γ ]− 1
2
γ
1
1−γ (1 + b
2γ
2−3γ )
1−2γ
1−γ (C.3)
Therefore, the difference in payoffs after a bilateral deviation from the
hhll circle to the isolated hh pair can be shown to be:
∆Πl = γ
γ
1−γ (
2− γ
2
)[1− (1 + b 2γ2−3γ ) 1−2γ1−γ ] (C.4)
Since the first and the second terms of the above product are positive
for any 0 < γ < 12 , it suffices to show that the third term in the brackets is
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negative:
1− (1 + b 2γ2−3γ ) 1−2γ1−γ < 0⇒
1
1−γ
1−2γ < 1 + b
2γ
2−3γ (C.5)
which holds for any b > 1, 0 < γ < 12 .
We have, therefore, shown that a bilateral deviation from the hhll circle
to the isolated ll pair is not strictly profitable for the low types.
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